Showing posts with label Judge Gropper. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Judge Gropper. Show all posts

Monday, September 7, 2009

G20 Truffle Hunters

Oktoberfest Awaits
What better way to ready myself for a long weekend of Germanic excess later this month than to start drinking as much beer as possible in my evenings going forwards? In truth this is going to be one of several legs of my stag do (aka bachelor party), although doubtless the messiest if everything I have heard about Munich is true.

Meanwhile the pace of life has accelerated significantly, hence the lengthening gaps between entries - although with the wedding just a month away now, perhaps that is not too surprising. Bloody hell, there's a thought - I suppose I ought to put some effort into listening to what L's talking about now as it's getting so close.

Bonuses: Political Truffles
The G20 meeting of finance ministers in London last weekend has proven as pointless as I expected, with politicians continuing to mine the rich seam of public resentment around banker bonuses that has always been there - good times or bad. Of course, the fundamental problem with this is that the political focus remains on the symptoms rather than underlying causes.

Bonuses are a small part of the problem that lead to where we are now. Certainly traders need to be deincentivised to ever make short-term decisions, hence the idea of performance assessment relating to any bonuses is a good idea. Additionally if I am being entirely honest (and I can be here), an awful lot of the financial products devised in the last 30 years are not as wonderful or essential to economic growth as bankers would like to pretend.


There is nothing new about packaging up of debt and selling onto multiple counterparties to enable the efficient flow of investment capital to where it is needed. The value of related products that enable speculative trading to take place on such processes is an entirely different point however. Do products that do not create wealth but only transfer it from one party to another serve any real purpose? Arguably they help markets determine value, but in many cases, as with speculative short selling, can instead skew valuations or undermine confidence in otherwise healthy companies.

One of the fundamental issues of the economy is it propensity to the 'boom and bust' cycle. As an asset bubble begins to form, the existence of these speculative trading instruments now enables traders to move in to capitalise on this very quickly. That would be fine if the markets rationally assessed value and pulled back, but instead the ability to hedge such strategies gives traders an incentive to 'bet' on how long the bubble will go on and to make as much profit from it as possible.

My view has long been that government and regulatory failure have actually been the root cause of the situation we find ourselves in. Banks need controls around their behaviour, and it is somewhat naive to expect such a large industry to all have the high level of morals and ethics to make the right decisions at all times if they have a choice not to. The quest to make money is an overriding factor that guides many if not most into finance after all, and unlike in politics at least bankers don't try to pretend otherwise.

What About GGP?
I know, I know - it's not like I could actually go an entry without mentioning it could I? Well, actually nothing visible is going to happen for some time now, so anybody sitting around watching daily charts would find the time better spent looking into other investment opportunities (and holding, I might add).

However there have been a couple of quite interesting commentaries that I recommend taking a look at. This commentary by Goodwin Procter on the GGP ruling
provides an interesting expert summary on perceived weaknesses in the SPE structuring exposed by Judge Gropper's ruling last month. The most pertinent of these is that independent directors going forwards should rightly also be considering the interests of the parent entity shareholders, despite the theoretical silo within which SPE's are designed to operate, external from such concerns.

Much more interesting is this detailed critique of Judge Gropper's ruling by Alston & Bird
. This is definitely worth some comment, as there are a couple of points I disagree with them on, although the conclusion in particular is excellent.

The commentary firstly notes the "unsettling" impact of the decision on the CMBS market, in particular several assumptions that lenders had previously made. It then moves onto the Court's assertion that its responsibility is to be viewing the issues at the corporate rather than individual entity level. Alston and Bird do not appear to agree with the one-sided slant to Gropper's reasoning, stating:

"The response of a secured creditor (of an SPE) might be to wonder why it suddenly must bear the burden of the parent’s financial difficulties. The court, however, sees an alignment of interests between the parent and the SPEs, asserting — wrongly perhaps — that the inability of the parent to restructure would inevitably impair the financial situation of the SPEs."

They go on to conclude:

"In reaching this conclusion, the court stops short of the full discussion one would expect in applying, and arguably expanding, the 'corporate family' doctrine to the GGP case... the corporate family doctrine should apply when the parts are worth far less than the whole, or, put another way, when the unity of interest protects not just the entities, but more importantly the underlying asset value.

It is not clear that this logic is sound as applied by GGP. The GGP SPEs, while part of a large, complicated corporate structure in one sense, were (or at least could be) operationally distinct, in that the malls could have been operated or managed independently from one another and the parent, either by GGP or another shopping center company or a sophisticated institutional investor. As such, the parts were not worth less than the whole—many healthy performing shopping centers could continue to operate successfully without the corporate parent."

Alston & Bird's analysis ignores several key factors. On the notion that assets could be sold off to rivals, it does not seem to account for a far from normal commercial real estate market. Where valuations of low volume, high value assets cannot accurately be reached, there is a significant scarcity of both credit and confidence, along with an industry wide requirement to deleverage. That being the case, any decision that had lead to a significant number of assets reaching the market in a short space of time would have been very unlikely to secure sufficient buyer interest to attain what could be deemed fair value in a functional market, and instead we would return to the 'fire sale' conditions reserved for companies forced to accept an uncompetitive price on an asset due to extenuating circumstances.

As for allowing the malls to be separately managed - that ignores the centralised management model that GGP operates under, as well as key functions around mall management that presumably the individual mall would have to pay for separately. While that might be coverable by the cashflows generated on that asset, there is no doubt that this would be inefficient and indeed would only ever be taken by creditors with interests unaligned with the underlying asset or wider collective.

"While the emphasis on preserving value for the collective enterprise is clearly the court’s focus, it seems unduly dismissive not even to discuss the contrary position, namely that separate loans to separate entities by separate lenders on separate properties should be treated separately."

I think it is for the reasons I have touched on above that Judge Gropper chose to not even entertain them in the ruling. It was quite intentionally dismissive, because to even hint at this avenue being viable would be to encourage activity that is detrimental to Chapter 11.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Gropper Decides 'Enough Diversions'

Delicious. It was like waking up to find a fine pie and chips, with a large pint of ale in a country pub waiting for me. That's really the only way I can describe my morning, as L dried her hair and woke me up, but knowing I was 'working' from home today AND then finding out that Judge Gropper has finally made his decision on whether the disputed SPE's should be included.

As I am sure anybody long on GGP is already well aware, the Court has published its memorandum of opinion on this issue, and has ruled in favour of General Growth Properties.

Despite the multitude of other arguments put forwards by the Creditors, Judge Gropper rightly centred on the issue of 'bad faith' as "the primary ground on which dismissal is sought is that the Subject Debtors’ cases were filed in bad faith. It is also contended that one of the Subject Debtors was ineligible to file." Page 4, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

While other arguments were raised relating to some malls not having other significant creditors, and the alleged need to include entities due to the centralised nature of the GGP business model (despite other entities such as the Joint Ventures not being included), these really were in there to flesh out the argument. The central premise of this filing has always been around the issue of proving 'bad faith'.

I mentioned in previous analysis that this was highly unlikely to be upheld based on Wells Fargo's own definition of this as:

"...a balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy."

Gropper's submission gives a useful summary of the GGP group structure including its loan structures - this includes detail on how the underlying CMBS are sold onto the wider market as re-REMIC's: something those who have been reading my recent posts will be familiar with. This demonstrates that the Movant arguments for dismissal of SPE's with a single creditor are actually nonsense:

"The REMIC in turn sells certificates entitling the holders to payments from principal and interest on this large pool of mortgages." Page 10, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In effect, negotiations relating to such SPE's can be extraordinarily complex under situations requiring an exceptional extension or refinancing agreement, and can realistically only be achieved with consortium consent, a cramdown or through Chapter 11.

As part of the court justification for the decision, the memo of opinion goes into some detail outlining the plight of General Growth Properties, explaining how its previously industry-standard CMBS refinancing model was left at the mercy of the credit crisis. The submissions goes into detail explaining the refinancing and debt restructuring efforts made:

"...but the lenders were unwilling to consent to additional forbearance, which in turn led to defaults and cross-defaults. Furthermore, the GGP Group was generally unable to sell any of its assets to generate the cash necessary to pay down its debts, as potential purchasers were themselves unable to acquire financing." Page 15, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This includes confirming GGP's inability to renegotiate loans set to mature by January 2010 due to the refusal by the master servicers to allow them to communicate with the underlying creditors. This has all been covered previously in GGP's own submissions, but clearly won over the Court as a convincing reason behind its need to move into Chapter 11.

The memo breaks down its ruling by addressing each of the key objection reasons put forward by the creditors.

Bad Faith Dismissal
The first point made is that 'bad faith' filings are "a judge-made doctrine" and not an absolute that can be proven by lawyers citing previous cases in their arguments. Gropper notes that dismissal of the SPE's from Chapter 11 on these grounds should only be granted "if both objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.” Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Additionally Judge Gropper concludes that no one factor on this issue can be determinative - the Court cites a previous ruling and states:

"It is the totality of circumstances, rather than any single factor, that will determine whether good faith exists... Case law recognizes that a bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for lack of good faith only sparingly and with great caution." Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, this goes back to previous legal analysis of Court submissions that ultimately GGP and the Court needed to consider what is in the best interests of everybody here, not just the few secured creditors that would benefit from liquidation. The Court dismisses comparisons cited with bad faith rulings made on single-assets real estate debtors, and slaps down MetLife in particular by pointing to the fact that both ING Clarion and Helios even concede that GGP do intend to reorganise and emerge from bankruptcy protection.

Objective Bad Faith: Prematurity
The court answers the allegation that GGP filed for bankruptcy 'prematurely' on entities with a maturity date beyond March 2010, as the prospect of liability was too remote. The Court answer is that this is irrelevant, the question is "whether the Subject Debtors were in actual financial distress on the Petition Date", and of course that is undeniable.

Ultimately this issue cannot be upheld because "the goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to incentivize a debtor to file earlier rather than later, so as to preserve the value of the estate." Page 26, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This ruling is summarised that it "...is not to assert that every stand-alone company with ample cash flow would necessarily act in good faith by filing a Chapter 11 petition three years before its only debt came due. However, contrary to Movants’ contentions, the Court is not required in these cases to examine the issue of good faith as if each Debtor were wholly independent." Page 27, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper finishes off by pointing to a weakness in the creditor's arguments on this: namely not explaining "how the billions of dollars of unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured responsibly if the cash flow of the parent companies continued to be based on the earnings of subsidiaries that had debt coming due in a period of years without any known means of providing for repayment or refinance." Page 30, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, General Growth Property had no choice to take the decision it did in filing for Chapter 11 protection, because it had no realistic prospect of refinancing at a group level and that was the only criteria it could make when choosing to bring the wider structure with it in the filing.

Inability To Confirm A Plan
Another of MetLife's more absurd arguments was the suggestion of bad faith because a plan could not be confirmed in advance of filing for Chapter 11, and that they would never be able to confirm a plan over its own opposition! The logic to this was clearly flawed, and Judge Gropper devotes an appropriately short space to citing previous case law that proves this is utter rubbish with no basis in the Bankruptcy Code.

Subjective Faith
The arguments here were around not negotiating prior to filing and the firing of several independent managers / directors of SPE's ahead of the Chapter 11 filing. The Court confirmed that actually Bankruptcy law does not require negotiations to begin prior to any filing - this is certainly not sufficient for proof of bad faith. Gropper adds his views on this:

"On this record, there is no evidence that pre-filing talks would have beenadequate to deal with the extent of the problem. Indeed, there is no evidence Movants would have been willing to work with the Subject Debtors." Page 36, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Again Judge Gropper reserves additional criticism for MetLife, who despite having some mortgage loans as well as the unwieldy CMBS structures that caused so many problems with negotiations of loans further out, revealed some fascinating views via their internal documents called for examination by the Courts:

"...there is no indication that it [MetLife] would have readily agreed to a refinancing of any of its loans." Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

"In December 2008, the head of real estate investments at Metlife identified its debt exposure to GGP (as a group) as a 'lessons learned opportunity.' A director and member of the research group responded, 'We wouldn’t do a loan with GGP now, given their problems.'" Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

That's what you call 'the Smoking Gun' regarding MetLife's intentions and hence need for General Growth to file for Chapter 11.

Relating to GGP's activities with its somewhat dubious late dismissal of Independent Directors of many SPE's ahead of voting in favour of joining Chapter 11, Judge Gropper surprised me by not just agreeing that this was contractually allowed and hence legal, but also largely agreeing that in many cases this was right and proper.

This was justified by GGP President Thomas Nolan, who explained that the issues requiring their dismissal arose from certain directors who were less experienced with restructuring environments and the challenges the project entities were facing, and who incorrectly agreed with lenders and "thought the independent managers were obligated to protect their interests alone." Page 39, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper goes on the record as stating that the firing of two 'Independent Managers' was "admittedly surreptitious", but falls back on the holes in the CMBS legal contracts, which gave GGP full control over such actions. You could say GGP got away with that one, although indications are that this would never have been a dealbreaker on the wider decision of bad faith, given the need for the Court to consider the wider interests - which is clearly a Chapter 11 restructuring.

Poor Old MetLife
I had long thought that MetLife in particular was whinging more than most of the creditors, with its plethora of largely unjustified complaints submitted to the courts. Perhaps over that bottle of fine 10-year single malt Scotch that should have arrived at the Court last week, the same occurred to Judge Gropper as well.

The Court acknowledged that as a consequence of Chapter 11, "creditors are now only receiving interest on loans, and have been deprived of current amortization payments, and Metlife complains that it is not even receiving interest on its mezzanine loan, which is secured only by a stock interest in its borrower’s subsidiary." Page 41, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

However the court concludes that no additional adequate protection has even been sought by the creditors, who have full rights to recover both the principal (original loan amount) plus interest and post-petition interest once a restructuring plan is confirmed.

"Movants complain that Chapter 11 gives the Debtors [GGP] excessive leverage, but Metlife asserts it has all the leverage it needs to makesure that its rights will be respected." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Let me translate from legalese: shut up and stop whinging.

Summary
Judge Gropper sums this up with true 'third glass of the good stuff at 1am and tired of writing 40 pages to justify himself' style:

"These Motions are a diversion from the parties’ real task, which is to get each of the Subject Debtors out of bankruptcy as soon as feasible. The Movants assert talks with them should have begun earlier. It is time that negotiations commence in earnest." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Impact On Other Rulings
This bodes badly for Citi's ill-timed filing yesterday
of a motion to grant relief from the automatic stay under Chapter 11 of its Oakwood Shopping Center. On paper Citi have a strong argument with precedent in their favour: GGP was undersecured by $10million upon entering Chapter 11 in April 2009, and crucially now after an asset revaluation (the accuracy of which is questionable in this market), there is arguably no longer any equity remaining within the property.

"Using KTR Realty's appraised value, the Lenders [GGP] are now undersecured by more than $19 million, or approximately 20.3% of the principal amount of the Loan."

Of course, millions of homeowners around the world are in negative equity right now, and without the support of an enormous REIT. However because they continue to service their loans they are not having a forced repossession.

When put like that, Citi's claim seems equally difficult to justify, as precedent rulings previously have not been in cases where loans have continued to be serviced at pre-filing levels, hence no actual material loss suffered by the creditor.

Given the arguments already put forwards above by Judge Gropper in dismissing other such cases, this one looks likely to be swiftly dismissed as well. With General Growth Properties share price now at a new 52 week high as I finish this, I look forwards to unrealised profits climbing ever higher.

Tuesday, August 4, 2009

Trader Territory Marking

As expected, the motion filed by Hugo Boss for a relief from the automatic stay (see previous entry for link to the motion) was roundly rejected by Judge Gropper last week. Otherwise this story is doing the rounds today, and illustrates how the 'sword' of Chapter 11 can be used as a threat:

"[GGP] said it was considering ways to treat some of its subsidiaries as a single debtor and override their status as separate companies."

This is actually going over old ground, although it would be useful to clarify there is an apparent difference in how substantive consolidation is being used. The major concerns of the credit industry lie in CMBS being substantively consolidated into wider loans such that the agreed collateral is no longer secure - this been addressed in court submissions and will be protected by the replacement lien and order for GGP to provide 'adequate protection'.

There is however a desire and incentive by GGP to consolidate lender negotiations where possible through the Chapter 11 process to assist in restructuring - the two are not necessarily incompatible, although GGP is clearly using this as a threat.

A sign of the changing tide perhaps - our first new trader since 2008 joined the Desk on Monday morning. Somehow we coped after Junior Trader's departure earlier in the year - we lost a character, but not a revenue generator. However increasing volumes and opportunities are encouraging the bank to pick up some people again.


I always enjoy watching new traders when they join a Desk.. the verbal rutting with the old hands an be highly entertaining as they attempt to establish their place in the team. In fact, for those who don't work for banks, just pop on Animal Planet when you get home tonight and you'll get the idea - replace the hogs and territorial scent marking with traders crude humour.

He might have turned into a pious, hypocritical waste of time now, but back in 2007 the columnist Cityboy gave this old example of trade floor dynamics, which plays out in various forms every week:

"Why are you such a fat bastard?" said the posh salesman to the barrow-boy trader, who admittedly did look like he'd been on the notoriously unsuccessful 'all pie diet'.

The recipient of this rather innocuous insult slowly swung around in his seat and with perfect comic timing delivered the oft-used but still classic response: "Because every time I shag your wife she gives me a biscuit".

It is how well a new arrival can handle themselves and fit in with the Desk dynamics that plays a major role in their success at a bank. Obviously though, that only goes so far. Exceptional sales contacts, or an innate talent to manage large portfolios and hence bring in huge amounts of cash make those further up happy and that is what counts most of all.

I've seen some real arses turn up over the years though, and not all have been the 19 year old Essex boy sterotypes - although on that subject, many of them are a particularly special blend of twat. With a stated aim of doing their trading exams straight out of school, these kids are often very average – not even skilled numerically - but to their credit they don't waste their time or money following a route of higher education – and with hindsight I don’t blame them.

I recall an Irish guy who arrived at a former bank I worked for, and made the mistake of continually boasting about senior roles at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs previously. He also made the mistake of looking down on the rest of us and making sure everybody knew it – I think in a misguided attempt to establish himself as the alpha trader.

Unfortunately that sort of attitude doesn't endear, and within a week the team had dug the dirt on him via ex-colleagues, and confirmed his overstated role and habit for bullshit. On his first day off, the team took some time out in the morning to ceremoniously unveil a sign above his monitor reading 'Little Fella' for him to find upon his return. A reflection of his small stature in more ways than just his height.

Interestingly that was a name which stuck for the remainder of his time there..

Anyway so far our new boy seems fairly quiet - listening and learning about the non-standard systems and what portfolio's he's inheriting. Let's see whether he starts pissing off anybody over the next month or two as he comes out of his shell.

Thursday, June 25, 2009

Decision Time Legalese

What a week.. if ever I needed a reminder why I want to set-up my own business and get out of the sector, working for one of the supposed 'elite' banks (aka 'slave driving bastards'), this is it.

I am on course to notch up a 70 hours week, which is just unhealthy - never mind it also equating to having no life.


I don't have much time to comment on anything, unless anybody cares more than I do about the centre pieces design. Wedding preparation intensity is non-stop: women have an amazing capacity to focus at such moments I have discovered. Work.. wedding talk.. sleep.. wedding talk.. work.. wedding talk.. sleep..

Without enough time to get back to researching other investment opportunities, I am back onto GGP for now, and there has still not been much movement on the key decision in the Court case, although it should be very soon. Judge Gropper has clearly had a busy week ploughing through the mountain of GGP motions submitted.

Most are minor, procedural changes proposed by GGP in light of it entering Chapter 11, so are unimportant to the outcome. On Wednesday we saw MetLife's motion to dimiss several of it's SPE's from the Chapter 11 filing go before the Court. The day before, GGP filed an objection to limit the testimony of MetLife's experts relating to refinancing, which they submitted here.

GGP questioned the expertise of the witnesses that MetLife sought to call for evidence, citing their lack of being on the MetLife Real Estate Investments Committee, which is "the decision-making body with knowledge of this topic." They also cite their 'lack of preparation' in reviewing the key issues in the weeks leading up to the hearing, such that they could not be deemed suitable to provide advice.


General Growth also sought to draw on the Court's expressed desire to fast-track GGP's case as a reason to dismiss them:

"Given the expedited nature of this hearing and this Court’s expressed desire to resolve the various motions to dismiss rather than hold yet another round of hearings, MetLife’s failure to provide witnesses with knowledge about this area of inquiry cannot be excused, and should not be without the typical consequences i.e., MetLife should be barred from presenting any evidence regarding what MetLife would or might have done with regard to extending or refinancing any of the loans at issue in MetLife’s Motion to Dismiss. Put differently, MetLife should be held to what its corporate representatives testified to -- and nothing more."

Well I am not convinced, but it is worth a try. Yesterday saw this response from MetLife,
and I recommend reading the introduction if nothing else, because the language is strong by legal standards and quite a laugh. MetLife's attourney's, Greenberg Traurig LLP, seem beside themselves with anger at GGP's attempt to have their evidence dismissed before it is even heard.

The motion to limit MetLife's testimony representatives is described as "nothing more than a desperate attempt by the GGP Debtors to exclude evidence that demonstrates that their entire premise for the filing of their chapter 11 cases is simply untrue."
MetLife go on to forcefully suggest that GGP's case almost entirely rests around its argument "that refinancing was not available to them in the face of upcoming maturities."

In reality that is not the case - just have a browse through my previous analysis for examples of the range of other arguments that GGP have put forwards. MetLife again state that refinancing was not an issue with the malls in question here "and they [GGP] know it". They go on to state:

"The testimony that the GGP Debtors seek to exclude shows that MetLife would have been, and remains, interested in discussing refinancings or extensions of the loans to the MetLife Borrowers."

'Retrospectively interested' seems more accurate to me. MetLife point out that they have refinanced "similar loans of similar properties within the relevant time period" but I suspect that is unlikely to stand up to inspection, as they were not for REIT's in technical default. It is also highly unlikely that MetLife refinanced those with equivalent maturities so far into the future, given the tax exposure factor that is cited in the Wall Street Journal as a flaw preventing many early refinancing negotiations to open.

MetLife suggest that the only reason GGP have submitted the request to exclude these testimonies is because of their 'devastating' nature to GGP's case. Indeed "the GGP Debtors are desperately seeking any pretext to prevent the Court from considering this important evidence." Yet if the other refinancing is not truly comparable as outlined above, then that is not valid at all.

More likely GGP were busy rocking the boat and seeking to exploit a weakness in the case by having witnesses removed. Either way, it is not yet known whether this motion was upheld or not, but I feel that it is unlikely to sway the ultimate decision on this issue, despite MetLife's claims.

Even if MetLife were allowed to provide witnesses who claim refinancing was a possibility, most of their evidence is conjecture and therefore debatable. This also does not counter the case that large numbers of SPE's did refuse to even open negotiations, which combine with factors such as GGP's claim of a need to remain integrated and proactively seek a means of negotiating with all lenders.

To my mind, if the motion to dismiss the witness exclusion was overturned then the strength of GGP's original case is unchanged - but if it was upheld then it undermines MetLife's case, which is probably at the root of their vehement response.

The hearings on Friday are largely not part of this more important issue, but expect a decision soon - I am still expecting a favourable outcome for GGP.


Wednesday, June 17, 2009

Big Fish Tantrums

I was dialed into the steering committee meeting yesterday for the post-insolvency / time wasting project , and who should dial in but the COO of the bank!

To put that into context, for those unfamiliar with working in the sector and the sheer size of the big investment banks, imagine a combination of a medieval king and Paris Hilton all rolled into one. Vast power, able to behead on a whim, combined with plenty of preening and a vast ego.

Thus he had not stopped by to listen and learn, only to be heard. Aww, bless him - isn't he cute?

We were treated to a 15min speech, although I wasn't bothered as I am not running this whole affair; it certainly didn't stop me reviewing the latest Court docs from GGP while he rambled on. In short though, he had dropped by to tell us all how pissed off he is that we have been beaten to the punch in delivering our insolvency solution by a major rival (announced in the WSJ on Tuesday).

Never mind the fact that ours will be far superior, applying not just in the US but globally, and crucially enabling Hedge Funds to margin securities rather than having to fully fund their positions - the whole point of Prime Brokerage after all. Nope, at the top this was a big corporate race, picture all the CEO's lined up in their sacks and jumping as fast as they could to the finish line. In his eyes we have lost - the trifling details are an irrelevance.

So the Court decision relating to GGP is going to take more time to reach a conclusion. Given the length of my four legal analysis posts, which in themselves are a hugely condensed summary of the arguments put forwards, I would have been surprised had the Court managed to review all of the submissions that have been flooding in right up until the last minute, much less reach a considered opinion so quickly.


The only public information out there is that the Court could take until the end of June before deciding on whether the proceedings by MetLife, Wells Fargo and ING Clarion Capital to remove their underlying collateral from the GGP bankruptcy filing are upheld. This ruling is important, as it would of course enable GGP to negotiate from a position of greater power with many more creditors, while using the combined cashflow as required, and should be able to secure more favourable extension terms. Regardless of the decision however, it will be useful for GGP to focus on its restructuring plan - expected that some time in August.

In an unrelated announced on Wednesday, Jim Graham, GGP's Director of Public Affairs also announced that the company had "very recently" made the decision not to sell the Bridgeland development as previously planned, and instead develop the site itself. This directly reflects the improvement in GGP's position since it filed for Chapter 11 and received DIP financing.

No longer is the firm desperately seeking ways to avoid Chapter 11, and is instead making considered decisions in-line with both Adam Metz and Bill Ackman's comments about there not being any rash asset sales. An encouraging sign that demonstrates mutually aligned interests with common shareholders.

Other minor points of interest this week:

  • Pershing Square submitted a motion on Wednesday for their Chief Legal Officer, Roy Katzovicz, to start receiving paper copies of all notices and papers going forwards. No reason is given, but it suggests that the fund will be taking an increasingly active involvement in GGP's legal maneouvering, planning and positioning over the coming months.
  • GGP have settled the DIPS financing claim with Brookfield Financial LLC and Goldman Sachs. The original claim was $5.78m, and the settlement is for $2.75m, and is fully supported by the committee of unsecured creditors.
  • Ahead of the deadline for objections by unsecured creditors, various claims have been filed. This includes the occupant at various malls J.C. Penney, filed a limited objection and reservation of their rights to the inclusion of related SPE's into the GGP bankruptcy filing. They add nothing to the actual case beyond suggesting GGP's inclusion of relevant malls "blatantly ignore the due process rights of numerous Lien holders - including J.C. Penney - who have Liens in or on property owned by the Debtors [GGP]".
  • A similar limited objection claim has been filed by A&K Endowment Inc, and many others - mostly around proposed amendments to establishing alternative procedures under Chapter 11.

Tuesday, June 16, 2009

Legal Analysis IV: GGP's Final Response

Okay this is starting to get excessive, but then this run up to the court hearing tomorrow has seen some interesting arguments going on behind the scenes. Yesterday GGP submitted their final response to the creditor's case ahead of the hearing on Wednesday, which is a baby at a mere 100 pages.

One key part of that was a dissection of the motion to dismiss the Chapter 11 case of the Fox River Shopping Center LLC by FRM Funding. FRM Funding had by then already submitted a motion to withdraw its objections to inclusion in Chapter 11. Although no reason was given, the case is covered in GGP's submission, and in all probability it was an assessment by FRM's legal team on the strength of GGP's case that lead to the withdrawal.

A quick review of GGP's final response to the creditor case:

1. MetLife / FRM funding 'bad faith' arguments fundamentally flawed
GGP point out that just because certain GGP subsidiaries are operationally sound with strong cash flows does not mean they could ignore the realities of the credit markets or their duty to maximise value. In other words willfully waiting until default and potentially being forced to liquidate individual entities would be an abuse of their duty to all.

GGP's team reiterate that the wider market problems meant that anticipating future problems refinancing all loans was nothing more than a realistic assessment of the credit markets, and hence the Chapter 11 filing was made in good faith. Additionally they note that the debtors do not even attempt to show that GGP's chances of a successful "reoganization is objectively futile."

GGP also refute that Chapter 11 is being used as a "sword" to gain a tactical advantage in negotiations with secured lenders (note: it is in reality, but let's ignore that), and instead refer to it as a "shield" that will protect the firm as it restructures the debt. In that case is Bill Ackman a knight in shining armour and MetLife the evil dragon?

It does illustrates the highly subjective nature of filing under bad faith. You can argue it both ways, but you need to have definite proof to make the mud stick, and the creditors case is not strong enough. Weil Gotshal & Manges also point out inconsistencies between creditor cases, with MetLife arguing the credit market problems persisting for a year or more is "sheer speculation" by GGP, while ING and Helios agree that the CMBS market has disappeared.

2. GGP filed for Chapter 11 protection for the same reason that ING and Helios debtors filed
This being the collapse of the CRE financing markets and the advantage of "participating now in an integrated, consolidated restructuring of project entities". This makes an effective point by illustrating that other creditors were filing against GGP by this stage, and undermines suggestions by those creditors objecting just because GGP filed first that taking no action was a viable option.

3. GGP filings included loans that had already cross-defaulted
Hence did not give GGP "a reasonable prospect of refinancing before maturity, and certain other loan characteristics that further exacerbated the need for a restructuring." This point is again particularly strong, as it demonstrates the financial stress that GGP was indeed under during the months of financial limbo when it moved into technical default on loans without declaring Chapter 11.

Additionally GGP dismiss this further by arguing: "There exists no basis in law or in fact for overriding these reasonable business judgments made by the Subsidiary Debtors [GGP] on the advice of sophisticated financial, restructuring, and legal experts."

The 'loan characteristics' referred to above are covered in more detail in this WSJ article from yesterday, which shows an increasing recognition by the wider industry and US government now that there are problems with the entire CMBS market. This goes back to the point that ultimately (due to tax reasons, as it turns out), many of GGP's lenders were largely unwilling to even discuss refinancing of any loans not due within a short period of time - a fundamental structural flaw of the credit markets.

GGP has to my mind received a significant boost from these potential plans to amend the tax laws to enable lenders to talk earlier. This gives a powerful argument that GGP really was forced into Chapter 11 due to market failings and exceptional circumstances, and hence should be fast tracked back out.

4. Dismissal for lack of good faith should be granted "sparingly, with great caution."
The defence elaborate further with previous court decisions that support GGP's case, stating that a petition for bad faith should only be granted when: "it is clear that on the filing date there was no reasonable likelihood that the debtor intended to reorganize and no reasonable probability that it would eventually emerge from bankruptcy proceedings."

The defence then go into detail dismissing all of the bad faith arguments that ING, Helios, MetLife and FRM have made in their filings, claiming none have merit.

5. GGP filings for bankruptcy had full corporate authority
GGP move onto FRM's claims around technicalities in the Fox River SPE filing, and rebuff with some telling quotes back from the original derivative contracts.

For those who have read my previous comments on the CMBS industry and how contracts used to be sold, you will know I have long said that nobody did any due diligence in the good old days. It was a zip 'em and sell 'em on mentality, and frankly nobody in the banks cared as long as people bought them. Only now are people running around complaining.

Let's face it, if you did due diligence you would never have sold CMBS contracts with this explicitly in the wording:
"Nothing contained herein or omitted herefrom shall prevent the shareholder(s) of the Company [GGP] from removing an Independent Manager with immediate effect at any time for any reason."

GGP's lawyers state that the loan documents include no legal opinion regarding whether Fox River was bankruptcy remote. Even more damning, and probably the final nail that forced FRM to withdraw their motion was the legal assessment of Fox River, which refutes the notion Chapter 11 would not enable any substantive consolidation (of assets and liabilities).

6. MetLife's 'speculation' on the outcome
In MetLife's recent response, they made a convincing case about GGP acting in bad faith, but a key point was that it was indeed based largely on speculation on their part. At the heart of this was an argument that there was no point moving into Chapter 11 because when it comes time to approve any restructuring plan, "there might not be any other impaired creditors and it [MetLife] might vote against a plan."

This response from GGP is all you need to say on the matter:
"..if creditors could get a bankruptcy dismissed at the start of the case simply by claiming they may not agree to a plan of reorganization, as MetLife claims, then chapter 11 would be rendered useless as creditors can always assert they will not agree to any impairment of their claims."

The defence conclude that all of the creditors seeking dismissal of the bankruptcy petitions are seeking "to impose a requirement that debtors face imminent collapse before seeking chapter 11 protection. But no such requirement appears in the actual text of the Bankruptcy Code."

Everything continues to point towards a favourable outcome for GGP, although law is a hornet's nest, so you never quite know what will come out when you start playing with it.

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Legal Analysis III: Creditors Make The Case

Well, L arrives into Heathrow tomorrow morning after her indulgent week of girliness in Chicago at the Bridal Shower. As such I had better spend today tidying up this dump - it's amazing how a week without the missus demotivates me in keeping the place clean.

The final part of this legal analysis series takes a look at the arguments being submitted before the Court next week by the creditors, with respect to having various SPE's (and hence malls) removed from inclusion in GGP's Chapter 11 filing. This gives the other side of the case, and hence an opportunity to assess how convincing this and their chances of overturning the earlier decision really are.

This article focuses on the case
being proposed by MetLife, and the investment fund Clarion Capital, which are two of the group of secured creditors being heard on Wednesday 17 June by Judge Gropper. Examing the various arguments proposed by the creditors:

1. Chapter 11 cases not filed 'in good faith' - the specific loans in question were all current and not in default. Upon closer examination, the creditor's claims around the filing are unconvincing in this respect. As GGP's defence team state in their response, calling it 'woefully inadequate' in establishing the burden of proof, I agree having reviewed everything they have put forward.

The creditors give evidence from previous claims to back them up throughout of course, and suggest that GGP is ineligible in this case, due to it being financially healthy and not insolvent:

"..given the enormous powers a chapter 11 debtor is given by virtue of the automatic stay, the exclusive right to file a plan, and the ability to discharge debts, these powers should be limited only to those facing financial stress."

If all GGP's problems due the credit market turmoil of the last 9 months do not equate to financial stress then I am not sure what does! The creditors then go on to cite the recent court ruling that has allowed a construction company to file a lien against General Growth to recoup owed construction costs, despite being in Chapter 11. In that case, the court stated:

"They [GGP] do not need a litigation respite, as do many chapter 11 debtors... Nor are they financially troubled debtors that seek in good faith to avoid a preclusive judgment in State court that would prejudice legitimate efforts to preserve value for the benefit of all of their creditors."

Insolvency is not a requisite for filing Chapter 11 anyway, as the creditors admit. The above Court ruling is quite different from establishing bad faith and I see nothing that suggests proof that GGP are doing anything other than attempting to sort out their problems. The only point worthy of consideration is below, although it is more than debatable that this is an abuse of Chapter 11, since it is precisely what the legal code is there to do - facilitate the move out of bankruptcy:

"The Debtors’ use of chapter 11 as a sword to obtain a tactical advantage in any negotiations to extend the Loan, when such Loan was not in default and does not mature until a year and five months after the Petition Date, is an abuse of chapter 11 that the good faith requirement is designed to prevent."

2. Loans in question were not due to mature for a significant period of time - as such there was "no present need [for] the.. debtors to file for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." Additionally MetLife claim that GGP "did not contact MetLife, one of the largest insurance company providers of real estate capital, about a loan extension prior to the Petition Date."

This point has been refuted in evidence submitted by GGP, regarding widespread creditor unwillingness to discuss extensions on all but loans due imminently. This cites that in some cases GGP were even refused the names of underlying creditors to contact. Thus, GGP may in this case have not been able to identify who to contact - either way, this point is secondary in the context of point 4 below.

3. The malls in question do not have any other significant creditors - thus GGP will not be able to cramdown a plan over the Lenders' objections.

This is a particularly weak point; citing dimissal of this SPE because it is primarily comprises a single lender, hence there is no advantage in Chapter 11 inclusions since GGP will still have to fully service them and negotiate with a single lender.

That again is refuted by the evidence submitted by GGP regarding how unwilling many lenders were to renegotiate loan terms and extensions pre-Chapter 11. It also ties back to the point that individually, lenders act within their own interests, which are not directly aligned with those of the company, other creditors (especially unsecured), shareholders or wider credit markets.

This Providence Journal article also suggests MetLife argued that GGP's attempt to 'cramdown' a wholesale reorganization plan for its mall properties will "hurt the insurer's financial interests." I do not see how that can be argued, nor have I found this point being made in the court submissions.

Being negatively financially impacted cannot be realistically argued as a motion to dismiss, beyond it 'hurting' MetLife and other creditors ability to negotiate: they do not wish to be forced to the table without holding all the cards. However all are having their loans fully serviced by GGP throughout the period at pre-bankruptcy rates, thus in theory should not lose out at all financially.

4. Chapter 11 were not filed with any reorganisational purpose - "the Debtors filed bankruptcy to improve their negotiating position by increasing the pressure on the lenders to accept refinancing terms."

Here is the reality of this entire dispute, and the primary reason for arguing for their inclusion is to obtain leverage in efforts to extend the maturity of loans. The rest is largely window dressing, and this is directly opposed by General Growth's claim of operating a centralized business model. I do not hold much credence with GGP's claim in this respect, but it can be very effectively argued and elaborated upon on the day in court, without creditors being able to disprove it.

The heart of the argument is that the creditors will continue to be fully serviced and do not lose out, whilst GGP gain the useful leverage from an automatic stay, and can utilise additional cashflow from the assets while enhancing their ability to restructure and negotiate loans.

Ultimately Judge Gropper has already indicated willingness to agree with the need for keeping GGP's "centralized business model" in tact, and for considering this case in the wider context rather than just those of some self-interested lenders. I see nothing submitted to the Court by MetLife or the creditors that will change that decision, and expect a favourable ruling for GGP next week.

Addendum to original post: late yesterday Wells Fargo issued this direct response to GGP's defence. Here they reiterate the original two points that prove 'bad faith' (inclusion of an SPE that generates sufficient capital to service its creditors, and inclusion of loans not imminently due to mature is unnecessary).

Additional points raised:

  • Wells Fargo cite the US government actions and potential expansion of TALF as an unknown, and that should have been relied upon by GGP as a reason to hold off declaring Chapter 11 and certainly including subsidiaries - a bizarre argument that will be rejected.
  • The Debtors [GGP] "brazenly replaced their Independent Managers on the eve of their bankruptcy filing in order to obtain a unanimous vote in favour of the bankruptcy filing."
  • SPE Operating Agreements require the Independent Managers "consider only the interests of Subsidiary Debtors and, therefore, are precluded from considering the needs or concerns of any entity other than the Subsidiary Debtors."
  • GGP's claim that the SPE's were essential as part of the GGP 'family' filings is "completely undercut by the fact that numerous affiliates of the Subsidiary Debtors were not placed into bankruptcy."

Key points here are that General Growth's actions in replacing directors was legal - it is expressly allowed under the terms of the CMBS contracts - and that although filing Chapter 11 is in the wider interest, it is intended for a positive reorganisational purpose that would benefit the entity too, so is therefore not 'bad faith' as interpreted in the spirit of the law.

The final argument around not all subsidiaries being included is the most interesting point, and refers to the joint ventures and other such subsidiaries not able to be placed into Chapter 11. This provides a strong argument against GGP's slightly dubious 'centralized business model' excuse, so it will be interesting seeing how this impacts the Court's decision. I see this as the main factor that could swing a decision against GGP next week.

The latter point is expanded upon by citing that GGP's explanation of the filings being "done to maximize the value for all stakeholders, including the employees, lenders, vendors and equity" is untrue, and instead were "solely for the purpose of maximizing the value of equity." That is correct, although it is arguable that employees, lenders and vendors will also benefit at a collective level from the GGP group having a greater ability to restructure.

In summary, I think the key issue around good versus bad faith is that (as quoted in Wells Fargo's submission), this is "a balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy."

In other words - was the decision to include GGP subsidiaries in Chapter 11 in the best interests of debtors and creditors, and does that legitimize the delay and costs? The previous Court ruling suggests that this decision has already been made, and in that context despite creditors whinging about it being unfair, it will not be overturned given that the 'cost' to them is actually only in terms of their leverage when negotiating with GGP during restructuring.

Friday, May 29, 2009

Different Worlds, Different Priorities

I had an exhausting long weekend in Chicago for a Jewish wedding, so have spent this week jetlagged and wishing L would give me just 5mins respite from wedding planning. I swear, every evening it's something or other - yesterday selecting invitation designs for the UK reception, another time the cake design or colour of ribbons for the chairs.

It won't get any easier tonight, as L took it upon herself to invite two friends (of hers) over for dinner, leaving me to keep my eyes open into the early hours and feign interest.

As I walked over here to my lunchtime bolt hole to write an entry, on this glorious summers day here in London, I mulled over Bill Ackman's PR offensive yesterday, in which he effectively drew a line in the sand with respect to GGP's reorganisation plan, and how if this was put into place he could see a conservative cap rating lead to a 13-fold increase in his investment return upon emergence from Chapter 11.

The plan that Ackman has suggested is very simple: extending most of GGP's $27bn of debt for 7yrs, which he argues will solve all the company's problems without requiring asset sales.

It certainly sounds feasible, although would be highly unpopular with many creditors. However in principle if the court agreed to such a proposal then that is precisely what could happen. All indications to date are that Judge Gropper agrees that taking decisions that protect the wider CRE market are in the public interest. Widescale loan extensions will nonetheless be fully serviced by GGP due to its viable operating model, so this seems quite feasible.

I had envisaged widespread 2yr extensions with limited asset sales, but Ackman is clearly setting out the case with the ideal scenario for common shareholders.

Anyway, there was a certain irony that I was toying with how it would feel to bag over £1 million profit from a trade as I wandered down one of the City's many backroads, when I overheard a middle aged woman - presumably talking on the phone to her husband - arguing over whether it was him or her that was supposed to have paid the £1000 for the mortgage that month.

Different worlds, different priorities. It makes me realise how much of a bubble I live in sometimes when I overhear a conversation like that.

I think that it is fair to say that the market has started to consider GGP as a potential investment opportunity now, rather than after bankrupcty. This is part of the market reassessment after the Court's positive rulings in GGP's favour relating to the SPE inclusion in Chapter 11, amongst other things, earlier this month. I was disappointed by the lack of market response initially, but I think it took time for investors to digest the implications.. I forget most are not so close to the detail.

The end result on closing yesterday, is that the share price has now risen by exactly 200% since GGP filed for Chapter 11 and opened at 60 cents a share on April 17. Not a bad return in 6 weeks for anyone bold enough to buy that day. Although I am averaged in above $1 myself, I am already sitting on a significant unrealised profit, which feels rather better than a loss, however meaningless.

Thursday, May 14, 2009

Round 1 To GGP As CMBS Industry Overplays Its Hand

I will move off so many updates on GGP soon, not least as I am busy looking into other investment opportunities. However there was enough news late yesterday to warrant an update.

Firstly on DIP financing, after swinging between bidders (and worth noting that bidding for DIP financing is in itself a rarity), GGP turned down both Pershing Square and a consortium lead by Goldman Sachs, and instead opted for the group lead by hedge fund Farallon Capital Management.

Details seem largely unchanged from before at $400m of funding with a 12% interest rate and no warrants, apart from a lower exit fee and now a potential 8% equity repayment option - that is subject to GGP's equity value upon emerging from bankruptcy.

At present the exact details of the DIP financing are not available, although The Washington Post quotes Ackman as saying: "This is the best DIP loan that has been done since the beginning of the recession, and it could be the best DIP loan ever in terms of the structural features that are favorable to the company."

All indications had been that the Court hearing yesterday was going to rule in GGP's favour. So it proved, with both DIP Financing approved, and Judge Gropper, presiding over GGP's case, ruling for the SPE's inclusion in the Chapter 11 filing.

This brings the inital phase of proceedings to a conclusion, after much legal wrangling (and whinging) on both sides. Various lobby groups representing the CMBS industry, fearing the ramifications from investors if their products did not deliver on the promised bankruptcy protection, launched into the most hilarious claims.

The end result was that they stretched credibility and overplayed their hand.

"The GGP bankruptcy filing could - if passed - be disastrous for the CMBS [industry] in the US" warned Conor Downey, a partner at Paul Hastings. He then went on to claim that such a ruling would somehow lead to an enormous downgrade of CMBS debt and that none could attain triple-A rating again.

The highly impartial Mortgage Bankers Association also added their voice, stating grave concerns over the 'catastrophic' impact of such a precedent.

An official from the CMSA (Commercial Mortgage Securities Association) also over-exaggerated the situation by stating: "It is not an exaggeration to say that if a CMBS lender cannot get comfortable with the isolation of the real property asset to be financed and hence the cashflows derived from the operation of such asset, then no such financing will occur."

Yes, except that this does not mean CMBS lenders could not get comfortable with isolating the asset being financed. Fortunately the seasoned Judge Gropper was unimpressed with such overstatement. Even earlier in the week, such claims had been dismissed as "hyperbole".

Judge Gropper overruled the objections yesterday, rightly saying that lenders rights were protected and General Growth should have access to cash collected at its subsidiaries. The notion that commercial mortgage backed securites somehow mean lenders have a legal right to control the cashflow is clearly wrong. It would hinder a viable company, capable of fully servicing its debts to those creditors, from moving out of bankruptcy.

Where GGP had been out of line was an implicit suggestion in the bankruptcy loan that the underlying collateral for the existing CMBS loans (i.e. malls) could be used as collateral for the new DIP loan. That illustrates what CMBS do provide - a guarantee that the asset cannot be misused, and will always be there to enable repayment for the creditors, even in a bankruptcy.

Matt Reid, a senior financial analyst at DBRS made a telling observation, by stating that "the GGP bankruptcy is unique in that most of its CMBS loans are performing reasonably well with strong debt service coverage and likely equity value above the mortgage debt."

Additionally Reid concurs with my previous analysis into the motives for including SPE's: "After reviewing the bankruptcy filing documents, we think the motivation for the filing of the SPEs is to generate better negotiating leverage with the special servicer to extract the value above the CMBS mortgages, while keeping such debt current. The plan is to use this cashflow as working capital during the reorganisation process, which could be several years. Such a ruling would be positive for unsecured creditors."

Round 1 to GGP and unsecured creditors then. It will be interesting how (or if) this impacts the share price later today upon opening.