G20 Truffle Hunters

Oktoberfest Awaits

What better way to ready myself for a long weekend of Germanic excess later this month than to start drinking as much beer as possible in my evenings going forwards? In truth this is going to be one of several legs of my stag do (aka bachelor party), although doubtless the messiest if everything I have heard about Munich is true.

Meanwhile the pace of life has accelerated significantly, hence the lengthening gaps between entries - although with the wedding just a month away now, perhaps that is not too surprising. Bloody hell, there's a thought - I suppose I ought to put some effort into listening to what L's talking about now as it's getting so close.

Bonuses: Political Truffles

The G20 meeting of finance ministers in London last weekend has proven as pointless as I expected, with politicians continuing to mine the rich seam of public resentment around banker bonuses that has always been there - good times or bad. Of course, the fundamental problem with this is that the political focus remains on the symptoms rather than underlying causes.

Bonuses are a small part of the problem that lead to where we are now. Certainly traders need to be deincentivised to ever make short-term decisions, hence the idea of performance assessment relating to any bonuses is a good idea. Additionally if I am being entirely honest (and I can be here), an awful lot of the financial products devised in the last 30 years are not as wonderful or essential to economic growth as bankers would like to pretend.

There is nothing new about packaging up of debt and selling onto multiple counterparties to enable the efficient flow of investment capital to where it is needed. The value of related products that enable speculative trading to take place on such processes is an entirely different point however. Do products that do not create wealth but only transfer it from one party to another serve any real purpose? Arguably they help markets determine value, but in many cases, as with speculative short selling, can instead skew valuations or undermine confidence in otherwise healthy companies.

One of the fundamental issues of the economy is it propensity to the 'boom and bust' cycle. As an asset bubble begins to form, the existence of these speculative trading instruments now enables traders to move in to capitalise on this very quickly. That would be fine if the markets rationally assessed value and pulled back, but instead the ability to hedge such strategies gives traders an incentive to 'bet' on how long the bubble will go on and to make as much profit from it as possible.

My view has long been that government and regulatory failure have actually been the root cause of the situation we find ourselves in. Banks need controls around their behaviour, and it is somewhat naive to expect such a large industry to all have the high level of morals and ethics to make the right decisions at all times if they have a choice not to. The quest to make money is an overriding factor that guides many if not most into finance after all, and unlike in politics at least bankers don't try to pretend otherwise.

What About GGP?
I know, I know - it's not like I could actually go an entry without mentioning it could I? Well, actually nothing visible is going to happen for some time now, so anybody sitting around watching daily charts would find the time better spent looking into other investment opportunities (and holding, I might add).

However there have been a couple of quite interesting commentaries that I recommend taking a look at. This commentary by Goodwin Procter on the GGP ruling provides an interesting expert summary on perceived weaknesses in the SPE structuring exposed by Judge Gropper's ruling last month. The most pertinent of these is that independent directors going forwards should rightly also be considering the interests of the parent entity shareholders, despite the theoretical silo within which SPE's are designed to operate, external from such concerns.

Much more interesting is this detailed critique of Judge Gropper's ruling by Alston & Bird. This is definitely worth some comment, as there are a couple of points I disagree with them on, although the conclusion in particular is excellent.

The commentary firstly notes the "unsettling" impact of the decision on the CMBS market, in particular several assumptions that lenders had previously made. It then moves onto the Court's assertion that its responsibility is to be viewing the issues at the corporate rather than individual entity level. Alston and Bird do not appear to agree with the one-sided slant to Gropper's reasoning, stating:

"The response of a secured creditor (of an SPE) might be to wonder why it suddenly must bear the burden of the parent’s financial difficulties. The court, however, sees an alignment of interests between the parent and the SPEs, asserting — wrongly perhaps — that the inability of the parent to restructure would inevitably impair the financial situation of the SPEs."

They go on to conclude:

"In reaching this conclusion, the court stops short of the full discussion one would expect in applying, and arguably expanding, the 'corporate family' doctrine to the GGP case... the corporate family doctrine should apply when the parts are worth far less than the whole, or, put another way, when the unity of interest protects not just the entities, but more importantly the underlying asset value.

It is not clear that this logic is sound as applied by GGP. The GGP SPEs, while part of a large, complicated corporate structure in one sense, were (or at least could be) operationally distinct, in that the malls could have been operated or managed independently from one another and the parent, either by GGP or another shopping center company or a sophisticated institutional investor. As such, the parts were not worth less than the whole—many healthy performing shopping centers could continue to operate successfully without the corporate parent."

Alston & Bird's analysis ignores several key factors. On the notion that assets could be sold off to rivals, it does not seem to account for a far from normal commercial real estate market. Where valuations of low volume, high value assets cannot accurately be reached, there is a significant scarcity of both credit and confidence, along with an industry wide requirement to deleverage. That being the case, any decision that had lead to a significant number of assets reaching the market in a short space of time would have been very unlikely to secure sufficient buyer interest to attain what could be deemed fair value in a functional market, and instead we would return to the 'fire sale' conditions reserved for companies forced to accept an uncompetitive price on an asset due to extenuating circumstances.

As for allowing the malls to be separately managed - that ignores the centralised management model that GGP operates under, as well as key functions around mall management that presumably the individual mall would have to pay for separately. While that might be coverable by the cashflows generated on that asset, there is no doubt that this would be inefficient and indeed would only ever be taken by creditors with interests unaligned with the underlying asset or wider collective.

"While the emphasis on preserving value for the collective enterprise is clearly the court’s focus, it seems unduly dismissive not even to discuss the contrary position, namely that separate loans to separate entities by separate lenders on separate properties should be treated separately."

I think it is for the reasons I have touched on above that Judge Gropper chose to not even entertain them in the ruling. It was quite intentionally dismissive, because to even hint at this avenue being viable would be to encourage activity that is detrimental to Chapter 11.

Exploiting Loopholes

The golden rule with tennis, as with finance, is to always put your money on the Swiss. Tough luck on poor old Andy Roddick though, the guy was rightly gutted and is too good to only win a single major in his career so let's hope he comes back and wins another.

So the final legal submissions have now been made - this includes General Growth's post-hearing submissions against MetLife and against ING Clarion and Wells Fargo. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and the unsecured lenders ING Clarion, Helios AMC, and of course MetLife. They are really just summarising the arguments already put forwards, although additionally MetLife submitted a motion to dismiss evidence submitted by GGP because the "Movants [MetLife] were not provided with a copy to review."

The evidence itself is a summary of the MetLife Debtor groups that own the two malls in question in this appeal. Ultimately they were included to provide evidence of the consolidation benefit to GGP that would come about from their inclusion in Chapter 11. Again, whether this is accepted or rejected is arbitrary and will have little bearing on the overall decision.

Additionally I recommend reviewing two interesting analysis papers discussing the impact of the GGP bankruptcy on the CMBS industry. The first is entitled The GGP Bankruptcy So Far: Grounds for Concern, Sources for Hope, (thanks to GGP Freak for bringing that to my attention - you mentioned it is from a post on one of the boards so perhaps you could post the link). Either way, the article provides an interesting additional summary from legal experts.

It agrees that the notion of 'bad faith' is unlikely to stand up to analysis and sway the impending decision, although here the authors focus on the eleventh hour dismissal of independent directors as the other key factor instead of GGP's ability to prove its decentralised structure and hence requirement to include SPE's in Chapter 11 not directly in default. As I have said previously, many of the arguments being made in this case are being made for the cameras, and this view is clearly shared:

"in the GGP bankruptcy, it seems that the independent director issue may not be fully pursued because of the practicalities of the situation. In the view of some, even if the motions to dismiss are not granted, it is important that these arguments are made, if only to force a decision that will at least provide a benchmark against which lenders can attempt to structure and price transactions going forward."

Also interesting is this observation on the impact of the agreed DIP financing loan from Farallon Capital Management, part of which will be used to pay off the Goldman Sachs loan: "Using the $400 million DIP loan to retire the Goldman Sachs facility effectively increases the leverage on these assets by almost 100 percent."

The second article 'CMBS Bankruptcy Remote Structuring and the Recession: Revisiting the Benefits', was published last week by the Bureau of National Affairs. It provides a much more detailed analysis of CMBS structuring, and crucially an analysis on how the GGP rulings to date are impacting the industry. One telling remark is that the SPE bankruptcy remote structure has been "largely untested" to date, and only once these are resolved will the credit markets be able to move forwards with confidence and accurately rate and price risk into credit investments.

Where this article is useful is in summarising key ways in which SPE's "theoretically mitigates" risks:

1. Independent Directors to vote/approve the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings - the controversial one that we know about from its alleged 'misuse' during GGP's filing, which illustrated contractual holes.
2. Limits Debt that an entity can incur - both secured and unsecured, the court rulings have upheld this concept and ensured that GGP will not be able to load them up with additional debt as a result of their inclusion in Chapter 11.
3. Ensure that SPE assets/liabilities are not consolidated with those of a parent or affiliate that is involved in a bankruptcy - in reality this has not taken place in GGP's case from their inclusion in Chapter 11 either, although there would be a significant benefit from consolidation of net cash flows and of course negotiations.

As if anybody needed confirmation that the markets were being presumptuous about CMBS's, the article comments: "CMBS sponsors and lenders, supported by many of the credit rating agencies, relied heavily on the assumption that the remote bankruptcy provisions, specifically the independent director provisions, in the SPE’s governing documents would provide protection against an SPE borrower filing for voluntary bankruptcy."

Where the article becomes much more interesting is an examination of the circumstances in which GGP has been able to utilise cash flows as a collateral. Normally it would not be allowed, unless the lender consents, or the debtor convinces the court that "the lender’s interest in the cash collateral is ‘adequately protected.' "

This notion of 'adequate protection' means proving to the court that "the collateral is not being dissipated to the ultimate detriment of the lender. Typically this condition is satisfied if the property continues to generate cash flow and the lender is given a lien on post-petition income to replace the cash collateral that is expended." Despite the turbulence in commercial real estate valuations, it is fair to assume that the value of the assets exceeds debt in all cases before the court at present.

As such this is precisely what the Courts have awarded all of GGP's lenders who have appealed for their respective malls to be removed from Chapter 11. Despite a lien on cash collateral not being as appealing to lenders than instant access to the cash flows from the malls, income is safeguarded by the decisions made by Judge Gropper, by ensuring they are serviced and repaid in the event of liquidation.

The article concludes a summary of ways in which the GGP rulings to date are impacting the industry and a realistic assessment of the next steps relating to restructuring. Ultimately the ability of GGP to control the independent directors of its SPE's is seen as a key weakness in the current structure of SPE's. The legal authors point out that despite this it is very much legal, :

"Despite the fact that the removal and replacement of the independent directors may have violated the spirit of the original agreement with the lenders, GGP’s actions were permitted under state law and do not appear to have been prohibited by the organizational documents of the SPE borrowers."

In fact, the article even advises lenders able to who have the opportunity to "revisit the governance terms of borrower SPEs, would be well advised to consider modifying the 'remove and replace' provisions relating to the independent directors."

In many ways this suggests that GGP's bankruptcy is unique in another sense, due to timing and its ability to exploit weaknesses in the contracts that will be closed in the future. That being the case, any investors contemplating on taking positions in other REIT's in a similar position to GGP should exercise caution. It would be unwise to simplistically assume that other companies will necessarily be able to exploit this loophole for long, and so need to investigate the underlying SPE structures and contracts.

And finally:

"As the GGP bankruptcy progresses, given the uncertainties in the valuation of commercial real estate in the current markets, it will be interesting to see whether GGP attempts to reduce required interest payments based on the current market value of its properties and, if it does, how the bankruptcy court will determine the valuations of these properties and how reduced values will affect the commingled use of cash collateral."

Bear in mind how early into the bankruptcy process this all is - decisions made now can be amended throughout GGP's period in Chapter 11 on appeal. Meantime all of the information is before the court, suggesting a ruling is impending.

Addendum: just tidied up this post - you could tell I wrote and posted it during the Wimbledon Final, what a bloody mess it was...