Gropper Decides 'Enough Diversions'

Delicious. It was like waking up to find a fine pie and chips, with a large pint of ale in a country pub waiting for me. That's really the only way I can describe my morning, as L dried her hair and woke me up, but knowing I was 'working' from home today AND then finding out that Judge Gropper has finally made his decision on whether the disputed SPE's should be included.

As I am sure anybody long on GGP is already well aware, the Court has published its memorandum of opinion on this issue, and has ruled in favour of General Growth Properties.

Despite the multitude of other arguments put forwards by the Creditors, Judge Gropper rightly centred on the issue of 'bad faith' as "the primary ground on which dismissal is sought is that the Subject Debtors’ cases were filed in bad faith. It is also contended that one of the Subject Debtors was ineligible to file." Page 4, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

While other arguments were raised relating to some malls not having other significant creditors, and the alleged need to include entities due to the centralised nature of the GGP business model (despite other entities such as the Joint Ventures not being included), these really were in there to flesh out the argument. The central premise of this filing has always been around the issue of proving 'bad faith'.

I mentioned in previous analysis that this was highly unlikely to be upheld based on Wells Fargo's own definition of this as:

"...a balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy."

Gropper's submission gives a useful summary of the GGP group structure including its loan structures - this includes detail on how the underlying CMBS are sold onto the wider market as re-REMIC's: something those who have been reading my recent posts will be familiar with. This demonstrates that the Movant arguments for dismissal of SPE's with a single creditor are actually nonsense:

"The REMIC in turn sells certificates entitling the holders to payments from principal and interest on this large pool of mortgages." Page 10, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In effect, negotiations relating to such SPE's can be extraordinarily complex under situations requiring an exceptional extension or refinancing agreement, and can realistically only be achieved with consortium consent, a cramdown or through Chapter 11.

As part of the court justification for the decision, the memo of opinion goes into some detail outlining the plight of General Growth Properties, explaining how its previously industry-standard CMBS refinancing model was left at the mercy of the credit crisis. The submissions goes into detail explaining the refinancing and debt restructuring efforts made:

"...but the lenders were unwilling to consent to additional forbearance, which in turn led to defaults and cross-defaults. Furthermore, the GGP Group was generally unable to sell any of its assets to generate the cash necessary to pay down its debts, as potential purchasers were themselves unable to acquire financing." Page 15, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This includes confirming GGP's inability to renegotiate loans set to mature by January 2010 due to the refusal by the master servicers to allow them to communicate with the underlying creditors. This has all been covered previously in GGP's own submissions, but clearly won over the Court as a convincing reason behind its need to move into Chapter 11.

The memo breaks down its ruling by addressing each of the key objection reasons put forward by the creditors.

Bad Faith Dismissal
The first point made is that 'bad faith' filings are "a judge-made doctrine" and not an absolute that can be proven by lawyers citing previous cases in their arguments. Gropper notes that dismissal of the SPE's from Chapter 11 on these grounds should only be granted "if both objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.” Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Additionally Judge Gropper concludes that no one factor on this issue can be determinative - the Court cites a previous ruling and states:

"It is the totality of circumstances, rather than any single factor, that will determine whether good faith exists... Case law recognizes that a bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for lack of good faith only sparingly and with great caution." Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, this goes back to previous legal analysis of Court submissions that ultimately GGP and the Court needed to consider what is in the best interests of everybody here, not just the few secured creditors that would benefit from liquidation. The Court dismisses comparisons cited with bad faith rulings made on single-assets real estate debtors, and slaps down MetLife in particular by pointing to the fact that both ING Clarion and Helios even concede that GGP do intend to reorganise and emerge from bankruptcy protection.

Objective Bad Faith: Prematurity
The court answers the allegation that GGP filed for bankruptcy 'prematurely' on entities with a maturity date beyond March 2010, as the prospect of liability was too remote. The Court answer is that this is irrelevant, the question is "whether the Subject Debtors were in actual financial distress on the Petition Date", and of course that is undeniable.

Ultimately this issue cannot be upheld because "the goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to incentivize a debtor to file earlier rather than later, so as to preserve the value of the estate." Page 26, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This ruling is summarised that it "...is not to assert that every stand-alone company with ample cash flow would necessarily act in good faith by filing a Chapter 11 petition three years before its only debt came due. However, contrary to Movants’ contentions, the Court is not required in these cases to examine the issue of good faith as if each Debtor were wholly independent." Page 27, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper finishes off by pointing to a weakness in the creditor's arguments on this: namely not explaining "how the billions of dollars of unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured responsibly if the cash flow of the parent companies continued to be based on the earnings of subsidiaries that had debt coming due in a period of years without any known means of providing for repayment or refinance." Page 30, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, General Growth Property had no choice to take the decision it did in filing for Chapter 11 protection, because it had no realistic prospect of refinancing at a group level and that was the only criteria it could make when choosing to bring the wider structure with it in the filing.

Inability To Confirm A Plan
Another of MetLife's more absurd arguments was the suggestion of bad faith because a plan could not be confirmed in advance of filing for Chapter 11, and that they would never be able to confirm a plan over its own opposition! The logic to this was clearly flawed, and Judge Gropper devotes an appropriately short space to citing previous case law that proves this is utter rubbish with no basis in the Bankruptcy Code.

Subjective Faith
The arguments here were around not negotiating prior to filing and the firing of several independent managers / directors of SPE's ahead of the Chapter 11 filing. The Court confirmed that actually Bankruptcy law does not require negotiations to begin prior to any filing - this is certainly not sufficient for proof of bad faith. Gropper adds his views on this:

"On this record, there is no evidence that pre-filing talks would have beenadequate to deal with the extent of the problem. Indeed, there is no evidence Movants would have been willing to work with the Subject Debtors." Page 36, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Again Judge Gropper reserves additional criticism for MetLife, who despite having some mortgage loans as well as the unwieldy CMBS structures that caused so many problems with negotiations of loans further out, revealed some fascinating views via their internal documents called for examination by the Courts:

"...there is no indication that it [MetLife] would have readily agreed to a refinancing of any of its loans." Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

"In December 2008, the head of real estate investments at Metlife identified its debt exposure to GGP (as a group) as a 'lessons learned opportunity.' A director and member of the research group responded, 'We wouldn’t do a loan with GGP now, given their problems.'" Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

That's what you call 'the Smoking Gun' regarding MetLife's intentions and hence need for General Growth to file for Chapter 11.

Relating to GGP's activities with its somewhat dubious late dismissal of Independent Directors of many SPE's ahead of voting in favour of joining Chapter 11, Judge Gropper surprised me by not just agreeing that this was contractually allowed and hence legal, but also largely agreeing that in many cases this was right and proper.

This was justified by GGP President Thomas Nolan, who explained that the issues requiring their dismissal arose from certain directors who were less experienced with restructuring environments and the challenges the project entities were facing, and who incorrectly agreed with lenders and "thought the independent managers were obligated to protect their interests alone." Page 39, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper goes on the record as stating that the firing of two 'Independent Managers' was "admittedly surreptitious", but falls back on the holes in the CMBS legal contracts, which gave GGP full control over such actions. You could say GGP got away with that one, although indications are that this would never have been a dealbreaker on the wider decision of bad faith, given the need for the Court to consider the wider interests - which is clearly a Chapter 11 restructuring.

Poor Old MetLife
I had long thought that MetLife in particular was whinging more than most of the creditors, with its plethora of largely unjustified complaints submitted to the courts. Perhaps over that bottle of fine 10-year single malt Scotch that should have arrived at the Court last week, the same occurred to Judge Gropper as well.

The Court acknowledged that as a consequence of Chapter 11, "creditors are now only receiving interest on loans, and have been deprived of current amortization payments, and Metlife complains that it is not even receiving interest on its mezzanine loan, which is secured only by a stock interest in its borrower’s subsidiary." Page 41, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

However the court concludes that no additional adequate protection has even been sought by the creditors, who have full rights to recover both the principal (original loan amount) plus interest and post-petition interest once a restructuring plan is confirmed.

"Movants complain that Chapter 11 gives the Debtors [GGP] excessive leverage, but Metlife asserts it has all the leverage it needs to makesure that its rights will be respected." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Let me translate from legalese: shut up and stop whinging.

Summary
Judge Gropper sums this up with true 'third glass of the good stuff at 1am and tired of writing 40 pages to justify himself' style:

"These Motions are a diversion from the parties’ real task, which is to get each of the Subject Debtors out of bankruptcy as soon as feasible. The Movants assert talks with them should have begun earlier. It is time that negotiations commence in earnest." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Impact On Other Rulings
This bodes badly for Citi's ill-timed filing yesterday of a motion to grant relief from the automatic stay under Chapter 11 of its Oakwood Shopping Center. On paper Citi have a strong argument with precedent in their favour: GGP was undersecured by $10million upon entering Chapter 11 in April 2009, and crucially now after an asset revaluation (the accuracy of which is questionable in this market), there is arguably no longer any equity remaining within the property.

"Using KTR Realty's appraised value, the Lenders [GGP] are now undersecured by more than $19 million, or approximately 20.3% of the principal amount of the Loan."

Of course, millions of homeowners around the world are in negative equity right now, and without the support of an enormous REIT. However because they continue to service their loans they are not having a forced repossession.

When put like that, Citi's claim seems equally difficult to justify, as precedent rulings previously have not been in cases where loans have continued to be serviced at pre-filing levels, hence no actual material loss suffered by the creditor.

Given the arguments already put forwards above by Judge Gropper in dismissing other such cases, this one looks likely to be swiftly dismissed as well. With General Growth Properties share price now at a new 52 week high as I finish this, I look forwards to unrealised profits climbing ever higher.

Exploiting Loopholes

The golden rule with tennis, as with finance, is to always put your money on the Swiss. Tough luck on poor old Andy Roddick though, the guy was rightly gutted and is too good to only win a single major in his career so let's hope he comes back and wins another.

So the final legal submissions have now been made - this includes General Growth's post-hearing submissions against MetLife and against ING Clarion and Wells Fargo. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and the unsecured lenders ING Clarion, Helios AMC, and of course MetLife. They are really just summarising the arguments already put forwards, although additionally MetLife submitted a motion to dismiss evidence submitted by GGP because the "Movants [MetLife] were not provided with a copy to review."

The evidence itself is a summary of the MetLife Debtor groups that own the two malls in question in this appeal. Ultimately they were included to provide evidence of the consolidation benefit to GGP that would come about from their inclusion in Chapter 11. Again, whether this is accepted or rejected is arbitrary and will have little bearing on the overall decision.

Additionally I recommend reviewing two interesting analysis papers discussing the impact of the GGP bankruptcy on the CMBS industry. The first is entitled The GGP Bankruptcy So Far: Grounds for Concern, Sources for Hope, (thanks to GGP Freak for bringing that to my attention - you mentioned it is from a post on one of the boards so perhaps you could post the link). Either way, the article provides an interesting additional summary from legal experts.

It agrees that the notion of 'bad faith' is unlikely to stand up to analysis and sway the impending decision, although here the authors focus on the eleventh hour dismissal of independent directors as the other key factor instead of GGP's ability to prove its decentralised structure and hence requirement to include SPE's in Chapter 11 not directly in default. As I have said previously, many of the arguments being made in this case are being made for the cameras, and this view is clearly shared:

"in the GGP bankruptcy, it seems that the independent director issue may not be fully pursued because of the practicalities of the situation. In the view of some, even if the motions to dismiss are not granted, it is important that these arguments are made, if only to force a decision that will at least provide a benchmark against which lenders can attempt to structure and price transactions going forward."

Also interesting is this observation on the impact of the agreed DIP financing loan from Farallon Capital Management, part of which will be used to pay off the Goldman Sachs loan: "Using the $400 million DIP loan to retire the Goldman Sachs facility effectively increases the leverage on these assets by almost 100 percent."

The second article 'CMBS Bankruptcy Remote Structuring and the Recession: Revisiting the Benefits', was published last week by the Bureau of National Affairs. It provides a much more detailed analysis of CMBS structuring, and crucially an analysis on how the GGP rulings to date are impacting the industry. One telling remark is that the SPE bankruptcy remote structure has been "largely untested" to date, and only once these are resolved will the credit markets be able to move forwards with confidence and accurately rate and price risk into credit investments.

Where this article is useful is in summarising key ways in which SPE's "theoretically mitigates" risks:

1. Independent Directors to vote/approve the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings - the controversial one that we know about from its alleged 'misuse' during GGP's filing, which illustrated contractual holes.
2. Limits Debt that an entity can incur - both secured and unsecured, the court rulings have upheld this concept and ensured that GGP will not be able to load them up with additional debt as a result of their inclusion in Chapter 11.
3. Ensure that SPE assets/liabilities are not consolidated with those of a parent or affiliate that is involved in a bankruptcy - in reality this has not taken place in GGP's case from their inclusion in Chapter 11 either, although there would be a significant benefit from consolidation of net cash flows and of course negotiations.

As if anybody needed confirmation that the markets were being presumptuous about CMBS's, the article comments: "CMBS sponsors and lenders, supported by many of the credit rating agencies, relied heavily on the assumption that the remote bankruptcy provisions, specifically the independent director provisions, in the SPE’s governing documents would provide protection against an SPE borrower filing for voluntary bankruptcy."

Where the article becomes much more interesting is an examination of the circumstances in which GGP has been able to utilise cash flows as a collateral. Normally it would not be allowed, unless the lender consents, or the debtor convinces the court that "the lender’s interest in the cash collateral is ‘adequately protected.' "

This notion of 'adequate protection' means proving to the court that "the collateral is not being dissipated to the ultimate detriment of the lender. Typically this condition is satisfied if the property continues to generate cash flow and the lender is given a lien on post-petition income to replace the cash collateral that is expended." Despite the turbulence in commercial real estate valuations, it is fair to assume that the value of the assets exceeds debt in all cases before the court at present.

As such this is precisely what the Courts have awarded all of GGP's lenders who have appealed for their respective malls to be removed from Chapter 11. Despite a lien on cash collateral not being as appealing to lenders than instant access to the cash flows from the malls, income is safeguarded by the decisions made by Judge Gropper, by ensuring they are serviced and repaid in the event of liquidation.

The article concludes a summary of ways in which the GGP rulings to date are impacting the industry and a realistic assessment of the next steps relating to restructuring. Ultimately the ability of GGP to control the independent directors of its SPE's is seen as a key weakness in the current structure of SPE's. The legal authors point out that despite this it is very much legal, :

"Despite the fact that the removal and replacement of the independent directors may have violated the spirit of the original agreement with the lenders, GGP’s actions were permitted under state law and do not appear to have been prohibited by the organizational documents of the SPE borrowers."

In fact, the article even advises lenders able to who have the opportunity to "revisit the governance terms of borrower SPEs, would be well advised to consider modifying the 'remove and replace' provisions relating to the independent directors."

In many ways this suggests that GGP's bankruptcy is unique in another sense, due to timing and its ability to exploit weaknesses in the contracts that will be closed in the future. That being the case, any investors contemplating on taking positions in other REIT's in a similar position to GGP should exercise caution. It would be unwise to simplistically assume that other companies will necessarily be able to exploit this loophole for long, and so need to investigate the underlying SPE structures and contracts.

And finally:

"As the GGP bankruptcy progresses, given the uncertainties in the valuation of commercial real estate in the current markets, it will be interesting to see whether GGP attempts to reduce required interest payments based on the current market value of its properties and, if it does, how the bankruptcy court will determine the valuations of these properties and how reduced values will affect the commingled use of cash collateral."

Bear in mind how early into the bankruptcy process this all is - decisions made now can be amended throughout GGP's period in Chapter 11 on appeal. Meantime all of the information is before the court, suggesting a ruling is impending.

Addendum: just tidied up this post - you could tell I wrote and posted it during the Wimbledon Final, what a bloody mess it was...