G20 Truffle Hunters

Oktoberfest Awaits

What better way to ready myself for a long weekend of Germanic excess later this month than to start drinking as much beer as possible in my evenings going forwards? In truth this is going to be one of several legs of my stag do (aka bachelor party), although doubtless the messiest if everything I have heard about Munich is true.

Meanwhile the pace of life has accelerated significantly, hence the lengthening gaps between entries - although with the wedding just a month away now, perhaps that is not too surprising. Bloody hell, there's a thought - I suppose I ought to put some effort into listening to what L's talking about now as it's getting so close.

Bonuses: Political Truffles

The G20 meeting of finance ministers in London last weekend has proven as pointless as I expected, with politicians continuing to mine the rich seam of public resentment around banker bonuses that has always been there - good times or bad. Of course, the fundamental problem with this is that the political focus remains on the symptoms rather than underlying causes.

Bonuses are a small part of the problem that lead to where we are now. Certainly traders need to be deincentivised to ever make short-term decisions, hence the idea of performance assessment relating to any bonuses is a good idea. Additionally if I am being entirely honest (and I can be here), an awful lot of the financial products devised in the last 30 years are not as wonderful or essential to economic growth as bankers would like to pretend.

There is nothing new about packaging up of debt and selling onto multiple counterparties to enable the efficient flow of investment capital to where it is needed. The value of related products that enable speculative trading to take place on such processes is an entirely different point however. Do products that do not create wealth but only transfer it from one party to another serve any real purpose? Arguably they help markets determine value, but in many cases, as with speculative short selling, can instead skew valuations or undermine confidence in otherwise healthy companies.

One of the fundamental issues of the economy is it propensity to the 'boom and bust' cycle. As an asset bubble begins to form, the existence of these speculative trading instruments now enables traders to move in to capitalise on this very quickly. That would be fine if the markets rationally assessed value and pulled back, but instead the ability to hedge such strategies gives traders an incentive to 'bet' on how long the bubble will go on and to make as much profit from it as possible.

My view has long been that government and regulatory failure have actually been the root cause of the situation we find ourselves in. Banks need controls around their behaviour, and it is somewhat naive to expect such a large industry to all have the high level of morals and ethics to make the right decisions at all times if they have a choice not to. The quest to make money is an overriding factor that guides many if not most into finance after all, and unlike in politics at least bankers don't try to pretend otherwise.

What About GGP?
I know, I know - it's not like I could actually go an entry without mentioning it could I? Well, actually nothing visible is going to happen for some time now, so anybody sitting around watching daily charts would find the time better spent looking into other investment opportunities (and holding, I might add).

However there have been a couple of quite interesting commentaries that I recommend taking a look at. This commentary by Goodwin Procter on the GGP ruling provides an interesting expert summary on perceived weaknesses in the SPE structuring exposed by Judge Gropper's ruling last month. The most pertinent of these is that independent directors going forwards should rightly also be considering the interests of the parent entity shareholders, despite the theoretical silo within which SPE's are designed to operate, external from such concerns.

Much more interesting is this detailed critique of Judge Gropper's ruling by Alston & Bird. This is definitely worth some comment, as there are a couple of points I disagree with them on, although the conclusion in particular is excellent.

The commentary firstly notes the "unsettling" impact of the decision on the CMBS market, in particular several assumptions that lenders had previously made. It then moves onto the Court's assertion that its responsibility is to be viewing the issues at the corporate rather than individual entity level. Alston and Bird do not appear to agree with the one-sided slant to Gropper's reasoning, stating:

"The response of a secured creditor (of an SPE) might be to wonder why it suddenly must bear the burden of the parent’s financial difficulties. The court, however, sees an alignment of interests between the parent and the SPEs, asserting — wrongly perhaps — that the inability of the parent to restructure would inevitably impair the financial situation of the SPEs."

They go on to conclude:

"In reaching this conclusion, the court stops short of the full discussion one would expect in applying, and arguably expanding, the 'corporate family' doctrine to the GGP case... the corporate family doctrine should apply when the parts are worth far less than the whole, or, put another way, when the unity of interest protects not just the entities, but more importantly the underlying asset value.

It is not clear that this logic is sound as applied by GGP. The GGP SPEs, while part of a large, complicated corporate structure in one sense, were (or at least could be) operationally distinct, in that the malls could have been operated or managed independently from one another and the parent, either by GGP or another shopping center company or a sophisticated institutional investor. As such, the parts were not worth less than the whole—many healthy performing shopping centers could continue to operate successfully without the corporate parent."

Alston & Bird's analysis ignores several key factors. On the notion that assets could be sold off to rivals, it does not seem to account for a far from normal commercial real estate market. Where valuations of low volume, high value assets cannot accurately be reached, there is a significant scarcity of both credit and confidence, along with an industry wide requirement to deleverage. That being the case, any decision that had lead to a significant number of assets reaching the market in a short space of time would have been very unlikely to secure sufficient buyer interest to attain what could be deemed fair value in a functional market, and instead we would return to the 'fire sale' conditions reserved for companies forced to accept an uncompetitive price on an asset due to extenuating circumstances.

As for allowing the malls to be separately managed - that ignores the centralised management model that GGP operates under, as well as key functions around mall management that presumably the individual mall would have to pay for separately. While that might be coverable by the cashflows generated on that asset, there is no doubt that this would be inefficient and indeed would only ever be taken by creditors with interests unaligned with the underlying asset or wider collective.

"While the emphasis on preserving value for the collective enterprise is clearly the court’s focus, it seems unduly dismissive not even to discuss the contrary position, namely that separate loans to separate entities by separate lenders on separate properties should be treated separately."

I think it is for the reasons I have touched on above that Judge Gropper chose to not even entertain them in the ruling. It was quite intentionally dismissive, because to even hint at this avenue being viable would be to encourage activity that is detrimental to Chapter 11.

Gropper Decides 'Enough Diversions'

Delicious. It was like waking up to find a fine pie and chips, with a large pint of ale in a country pub waiting for me. That's really the only way I can describe my morning, as L dried her hair and woke me up, but knowing I was 'working' from home today AND then finding out that Judge Gropper has finally made his decision on whether the disputed SPE's should be included.

As I am sure anybody long on GGP is already well aware, the Court has published its memorandum of opinion on this issue, and has ruled in favour of General Growth Properties.

Despite the multitude of other arguments put forwards by the Creditors, Judge Gropper rightly centred on the issue of 'bad faith' as "the primary ground on which dismissal is sought is that the Subject Debtors’ cases were filed in bad faith. It is also contended that one of the Subject Debtors was ineligible to file." Page 4, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

While other arguments were raised relating to some malls not having other significant creditors, and the alleged need to include entities due to the centralised nature of the GGP business model (despite other entities such as the Joint Ventures not being included), these really were in there to flesh out the argument. The central premise of this filing has always been around the issue of proving 'bad faith'.

I mentioned in previous analysis that this was highly unlikely to be upheld based on Wells Fargo's own definition of this as:

"...a balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy."

Gropper's submission gives a useful summary of the GGP group structure including its loan structures - this includes detail on how the underlying CMBS are sold onto the wider market as re-REMIC's: something those who have been reading my recent posts will be familiar with. This demonstrates that the Movant arguments for dismissal of SPE's with a single creditor are actually nonsense:

"The REMIC in turn sells certificates entitling the holders to payments from principal and interest on this large pool of mortgages." Page 10, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In effect, negotiations relating to such SPE's can be extraordinarily complex under situations requiring an exceptional extension or refinancing agreement, and can realistically only be achieved with consortium consent, a cramdown or through Chapter 11.

As part of the court justification for the decision, the memo of opinion goes into some detail outlining the plight of General Growth Properties, explaining how its previously industry-standard CMBS refinancing model was left at the mercy of the credit crisis. The submissions goes into detail explaining the refinancing and debt restructuring efforts made:

"...but the lenders were unwilling to consent to additional forbearance, which in turn led to defaults and cross-defaults. Furthermore, the GGP Group was generally unable to sell any of its assets to generate the cash necessary to pay down its debts, as potential purchasers were themselves unable to acquire financing." Page 15, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This includes confirming GGP's inability to renegotiate loans set to mature by January 2010 due to the refusal by the master servicers to allow them to communicate with the underlying creditors. This has all been covered previously in GGP's own submissions, but clearly won over the Court as a convincing reason behind its need to move into Chapter 11.

The memo breaks down its ruling by addressing each of the key objection reasons put forward by the creditors.

Bad Faith Dismissal
The first point made is that 'bad faith' filings are "a judge-made doctrine" and not an absolute that can be proven by lawyers citing previous cases in their arguments. Gropper notes that dismissal of the SPE's from Chapter 11 on these grounds should only be granted "if both objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.” Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Additionally Judge Gropper concludes that no one factor on this issue can be determinative - the Court cites a previous ruling and states:

"It is the totality of circumstances, rather than any single factor, that will determine whether good faith exists... Case law recognizes that a bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for lack of good faith only sparingly and with great caution." Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, this goes back to previous legal analysis of Court submissions that ultimately GGP and the Court needed to consider what is in the best interests of everybody here, not just the few secured creditors that would benefit from liquidation. The Court dismisses comparisons cited with bad faith rulings made on single-assets real estate debtors, and slaps down MetLife in particular by pointing to the fact that both ING Clarion and Helios even concede that GGP do intend to reorganise and emerge from bankruptcy protection.

Objective Bad Faith: Prematurity
The court answers the allegation that GGP filed for bankruptcy 'prematurely' on entities with a maturity date beyond March 2010, as the prospect of liability was too remote. The Court answer is that this is irrelevant, the question is "whether the Subject Debtors were in actual financial distress on the Petition Date", and of course that is undeniable.

Ultimately this issue cannot be upheld because "the goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to incentivize a debtor to file earlier rather than later, so as to preserve the value of the estate." Page 26, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This ruling is summarised that it "...is not to assert that every stand-alone company with ample cash flow would necessarily act in good faith by filing a Chapter 11 petition three years before its only debt came due. However, contrary to Movants’ contentions, the Court is not required in these cases to examine the issue of good faith as if each Debtor were wholly independent." Page 27, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper finishes off by pointing to a weakness in the creditor's arguments on this: namely not explaining "how the billions of dollars of unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured responsibly if the cash flow of the parent companies continued to be based on the earnings of subsidiaries that had debt coming due in a period of years without any known means of providing for repayment or refinance." Page 30, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, General Growth Property had no choice to take the decision it did in filing for Chapter 11 protection, because it had no realistic prospect of refinancing at a group level and that was the only criteria it could make when choosing to bring the wider structure with it in the filing.

Inability To Confirm A Plan
Another of MetLife's more absurd arguments was the suggestion of bad faith because a plan could not be confirmed in advance of filing for Chapter 11, and that they would never be able to confirm a plan over its own opposition! The logic to this was clearly flawed, and Judge Gropper devotes an appropriately short space to citing previous case law that proves this is utter rubbish with no basis in the Bankruptcy Code.

Subjective Faith
The arguments here were around not negotiating prior to filing and the firing of several independent managers / directors of SPE's ahead of the Chapter 11 filing. The Court confirmed that actually Bankruptcy law does not require negotiations to begin prior to any filing - this is certainly not sufficient for proof of bad faith. Gropper adds his views on this:

"On this record, there is no evidence that pre-filing talks would have beenadequate to deal with the extent of the problem. Indeed, there is no evidence Movants would have been willing to work with the Subject Debtors." Page 36, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Again Judge Gropper reserves additional criticism for MetLife, who despite having some mortgage loans as well as the unwieldy CMBS structures that caused so many problems with negotiations of loans further out, revealed some fascinating views via their internal documents called for examination by the Courts:

"...there is no indication that it [MetLife] would have readily agreed to a refinancing of any of its loans." Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

"In December 2008, the head of real estate investments at Metlife identified its debt exposure to GGP (as a group) as a 'lessons learned opportunity.' A director and member of the research group responded, 'We wouldn’t do a loan with GGP now, given their problems.'" Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

That's what you call 'the Smoking Gun' regarding MetLife's intentions and hence need for General Growth to file for Chapter 11.

Relating to GGP's activities with its somewhat dubious late dismissal of Independent Directors of many SPE's ahead of voting in favour of joining Chapter 11, Judge Gropper surprised me by not just agreeing that this was contractually allowed and hence legal, but also largely agreeing that in many cases this was right and proper.

This was justified by GGP President Thomas Nolan, who explained that the issues requiring their dismissal arose from certain directors who were less experienced with restructuring environments and the challenges the project entities were facing, and who incorrectly agreed with lenders and "thought the independent managers were obligated to protect their interests alone." Page 39, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper goes on the record as stating that the firing of two 'Independent Managers' was "admittedly surreptitious", but falls back on the holes in the CMBS legal contracts, which gave GGP full control over such actions. You could say GGP got away with that one, although indications are that this would never have been a dealbreaker on the wider decision of bad faith, given the need for the Court to consider the wider interests - which is clearly a Chapter 11 restructuring.

Poor Old MetLife
I had long thought that MetLife in particular was whinging more than most of the creditors, with its plethora of largely unjustified complaints submitted to the courts. Perhaps over that bottle of fine 10-year single malt Scotch that should have arrived at the Court last week, the same occurred to Judge Gropper as well.

The Court acknowledged that as a consequence of Chapter 11, "creditors are now only receiving interest on loans, and have been deprived of current amortization payments, and Metlife complains that it is not even receiving interest on its mezzanine loan, which is secured only by a stock interest in its borrower’s subsidiary." Page 41, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

However the court concludes that no additional adequate protection has even been sought by the creditors, who have full rights to recover both the principal (original loan amount) plus interest and post-petition interest once a restructuring plan is confirmed.

"Movants complain that Chapter 11 gives the Debtors [GGP] excessive leverage, but Metlife asserts it has all the leverage it needs to makesure that its rights will be respected." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Let me translate from legalese: shut up and stop whinging.

Summary
Judge Gropper sums this up with true 'third glass of the good stuff at 1am and tired of writing 40 pages to justify himself' style:

"These Motions are a diversion from the parties’ real task, which is to get each of the Subject Debtors out of bankruptcy as soon as feasible. The Movants assert talks with them should have begun earlier. It is time that negotiations commence in earnest." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Impact On Other Rulings
This bodes badly for Citi's ill-timed filing yesterday of a motion to grant relief from the automatic stay under Chapter 11 of its Oakwood Shopping Center. On paper Citi have a strong argument with precedent in their favour: GGP was undersecured by $10million upon entering Chapter 11 in April 2009, and crucially now after an asset revaluation (the accuracy of which is questionable in this market), there is arguably no longer any equity remaining within the property.

"Using KTR Realty's appraised value, the Lenders [GGP] are now undersecured by more than $19 million, or approximately 20.3% of the principal amount of the Loan."

Of course, millions of homeowners around the world are in negative equity right now, and without the support of an enormous REIT. However because they continue to service their loans they are not having a forced repossession.

When put like that, Citi's claim seems equally difficult to justify, as precedent rulings previously have not been in cases where loans have continued to be serviced at pre-filing levels, hence no actual material loss suffered by the creditor.

Given the arguments already put forwards above by Judge Gropper in dismissing other such cases, this one looks likely to be swiftly dismissed as well. With General Growth Properties share price now at a new 52 week high as I finish this, I look forwards to unrealised profits climbing ever higher.

Risk Mananging Asset Backed Securitization

GGP Q2 Results
General Growth Properties Q2 results were better than the markets expected. When you strip out exceptionals, many of which are related to Chapter 11 costs, the fundamentals are encouraging, and have rightly been reflected in a significant rise in the share price.

Taking a look at the breakdown, the immediate comparisons appear poor: Funds From Operation (FFO) are down by 73.8% year on year, Core FFO is also down 43.9%. However of much great importance is GGP's Net Operating Income (NOI) - down a much more modest 11% in total, and a very good figure both in comparison to GGP's major peers and market expectations. In fact, excluding the main drag from the MPC's (Master Planned Communities) - with those stripped out we reach the headline figure reported for the main Retail businesses, with NOI down a mere 2.1% on the previous year.

Relatively strong fundamentals adds further credibility to the GGP business model. The increasing market capitalization of the firm is a direct reflection of growing confidence across the market in its ability to successfully restructure without excessive equity dilution.

Bubbles & Risk Management
I fully admit to not seeing the credit crunch coming until it was too late, and if most people are honest they did not either. In fact, nor did most of the noted commentators - it was a rare few who warned of the dire effects of a credit withdrawal with the years in advance required to avoid these problems.

I thought the dot com and recent housing bubbles were both glaringly obvious, and stayed well out of both. However as I discovered with the credit crunch, bubbles are not always so clear - they have to be hard to spot to enable them to build up.

Risk management was a dirty word on the Street a few years ago. On a few occasions, I remember sneering with the best of them, as calls from risk management about positions being taken were viewed as unnecessarily cautionary. And consistently unnecessary as the high earners and income generators within my former bank confidently dismissed them as overly conservative. I was naively a believer in the pure capitalist argument that too much collateral tied up money that could and should be actively and productively used as part of the development of the 'new economy'. The financial instruments now in use were different; these managed risk as inherent in their design.

Whenever anybody starts justifying practices that generate extraordinary profits and inserts the word 'new' in the context of economics, it is time to beware. Things really weren't different this time of course, just as recessions and crises have occurred with startling regularity throughout the last century. My take on this is that it is the different generation of investors ultimately ensures that reoccurrence. Much like investment, few take the time to research before jumping in, and hence do not learn the lessons of history.

Additionally throw in the less sophisticated consumers in the emerging markets and bubbles in India and China in particular are a virtual certainty – that means the potential to exploit significant, quick profit in the coming years ahead for those willing to take the time to invest in these markets and not play safe at home (much more on this theme another time).

Risk Management of Asset Backed Securities
The one plus of this learning process for our generation is that the regulators have been taking a hard look at the woeful risk management practices in many of the large banks - particularly in the context of asset backed securitization.

The US government is proposing several key legislative changes, which are worth understanding for those inside and outside the industry:

1. Any bank, non-bank issuer or underwriter of an asset-backed security must retain at least a 5% interest of the credit risk in such assets for an as-yet unspecified period or form. Crucially that would be without hedging - the theory being that if firms are themselves exposed to what they are trading, they as shareholders and owners of the banks will take the issue of risk a great deal more seriously.
   
2. Requirement to continue reporting by issuers of asset-backed securities even if the number of holders falls below 300 - this has relevance to the low level issuance/ownership of Structured Purpose Entities (SPE's) that we have seen in General Growth Properties bankruptcy, whereby some creditors have effectively been the sole lender. At present these structures escape under the reporting radar, but soon no longer.


3. Requirement to disclose standardised asset-level or loan-level data and standardised compensation and risk retention information. This really does not have much bearing on risk management, and seems to have been inserted to placate those wishing to have some disclosure of bankers compensation.
   
4. Regulations on the use of representations and warranties in the asset-backed securities market that would require credit rating agencies to include additional analysis in their reports - this would require disclosure permitting investors to identify originators with clear underwriting deficiencies.


5. Elimination of the offering exemption for certain real estate mortgage notes and related participation interests.

If these proposals are adopted, the impact on the securitisation market will depend on the nature and scope of the regulations that are ultimately developed. However it is that first proposal relating to forced exposure which knowing the banks will be the most effective means of ensuring responsible behaviour.

As the cocky young traders I describe in my last entry have long proven, it is easy to play dice with other people's money – and in the right period for the economy a total muppet can make money. However put your own money on the table, and you think about the risk far more seriously. This links back to what bonuses are meant to be about - a performance linked assessment that incentivises traders to trade as effectively as possible – it is that glaring short-termist flaw in them that has been exposed and is rightly attracting criticism.

Bonus reforms remain another vital change that needs to be imposed on the sector, and if I can recognise that then you know there is no excuse for those disagreeing.

Trader Territory Marking

As expected, the motion filed by Hugo Boss for a relief from the automatic stay (see previous entry for link to the motion) was roundly rejected by Judge Gropper last week. Otherwise this story is doing the rounds today, and illustrates how the 'sword' of Chapter 11 can be used as a threat:

"[GGP] said it was considering ways to treat some of its subsidiaries as a single debtor and override their status as separate companies."

This is actually going over old ground, although it would be useful to clarify there is an apparent difference in how substantive consolidation is being used. The major concerns of the credit industry lie in CMBS being substantively consolidated into wider loans such that the agreed collateral is no longer secure - this been addressed in court submissions and will be protected by the replacement lien and order for GGP to provide 'adequate protection'.

There is however a desire and incentive by GGP to consolidate lender negotiations where possible through the Chapter 11 process to assist in restructuring - the two are not necessarily incompatible, although GGP is clearly using this as a threat.

A sign of the changing tide perhaps - our first new trader since 2008 joined the Desk on Monday morning. Somehow we coped after Junior Trader's departure earlier in the year - we lost a character, but not a revenue generator. However increasing volumes and opportunities are encouraging the bank to pick up some people again.

I always enjoy watching new traders when they join a Desk.. the verbal rutting with the old hands an be highly entertaining as they attempt to establish their place in the team. In fact, for those who don't work for banks, just pop on Animal Planet when you get home tonight and you'll get the idea - replace the hogs and territorial scent marking with traders crude humour.

He might have turned into a pious, hypocritical waste of time now, but back in 2007 the columnist Cityboy gave this old example of trade floor dynamics, which plays out in various forms every week:

"Why are you such a fat bastard?" said the posh salesman to the barrow-boy trader, who admittedly did look like he'd been on the notoriously unsuccessful 'all pie diet'.

The recipient of this rather innocuous insult slowly swung around in his seat and with perfect comic timing delivered the oft-used but still classic response: "Because every time I shag your wife she gives me a biscuit".

It is how well a new arrival can handle themselves and fit in with the Desk dynamics that plays a major role in their success at a bank. Obviously though, that only goes so far. Exceptional sales contacts, or an innate talent to manage large portfolios and hence bring in huge amounts of cash make those further up happy and that is what counts most of all.

I've seen some real arses turn up over the years though, and not all have been the 19 year old Essex boy sterotypes - although on that subject, many of them are a particularly special blend of twat. With a stated aim of doing their trading exams straight out of school, these kids are often very average – not even skilled numerically - but to their credit they don't waste their time or money following a route of higher education – and with hindsight I don’t blame them.

I recall an Irish guy who arrived at a former bank I worked for, and made the mistake of continually boasting about senior roles at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs previously. He also made the mistake of looking down on the rest of us and making sure everybody knew it – I think in a misguided attempt to establish himself as the alpha trader.

Unfortunately that sort of attitude doesn't endear, and within a week the team had dug the dirt on him via ex-colleagues, and confirmed his overstated role and habit for bullshit. On his first day off, the team took some time out in the morning to ceremoniously unveil a sign above his monitor reading 'Little Fella' for him to find upon his return. A reflection of his small stature in more ways than just his height.

Interestingly that was a name which stuck for the remainder of his time there..

Anyway so far our new boy seems fairly quiet - listening and learning about the non-standard systems and what portfolio's he's inheriting. Let's see whether he starts pissing off anybody over the next month or two as he comes out of his shell.

Credit Markets and Rating Agency 'Refinement'

This is a follow on from my analysis in May into the credit markets and rating agencies, when Fitch assured that it would continue to monitor GGP assets in the context of bankruptcy proceedings (although the implication was for further downgrades).

Rating Agency Antics Fuel Uncertainty
This process continued last month when Standard & Poor's began to tighten their criteria for rating CMBS, with figures quoted as high as $235bn worth of commercial bonds under threat of losing their AAA status.  Now in the WSJ today, Standard & Poor announced that it has just reversed "its evaluation of a clutch of mortgage bonds backed by commercial property." It has re-rated a number which are part of the GG-10 benchmark securitization back to the crucial AAA status required for TALF legacy eligibility - and all just a week after downgrading them.

GG-10 is a large $8bn commercial mortgage backed security bond, that has large numbers of loans resecuritized each year across the market by dealers - so ratings on this baby serve as a bellwether for the health (or problems) of the wider commercial credit market. Looking into S&P's published methodology refinement in more detail, the Fed's desire to support commercial real estate is certainly a possible factor in this turnaround.

If so then that should come as no surprise - the impartiality of rating agencies has always been questionable. Note: for more on this, I highly recommend reviewing this great commentary by Linda Lowell of Housing Wire, on the ratings agencies and their impact on CMBS markets (particularly how S&P could not provide any meaningful backing to JP Morgan analysts regarding their previous change that lead to the downgrades). 

Suffice to say that the late June rally in CMBS resecuritizations was impacted by the ratings downgrade rumours and counter-rumours, as dealers were unable to price with certainty, unsure that triple-A paper classes at the time still would be so for much longer.

What Are S&P Changing?
So behind all this, quoting from the S&P methodology changes announced, the following key aspects are being amended:

• Amending how losses and recoveries resulting from 'AAA' rating scenarios for super-senior classes in US conduit/fusion CMBS are assessed.
• Differentiating the timing of losses from 'AAA' term and maturity default tests when cash flow modelling transactions.
• Spreading out losses that are applied to a transaction's certificates over a longer period of time.
  
  

The latter is the most meaningful change, since it allows for exceptional short-term losses to be effectively averaged, and hence to smooth out rating changes and thus reduce the occurrence of short term rating changes that are subsequently reversed.

S&P Methodology Outlined
For those interested, from Standard & Poor's own paper is the refined 3-step approach that they will be using for rating conduit and fusion transactions:

1. Aggregate recoveries from defaults in the 'AAA' scenario and credit impaired assets up to the crossover date. [NB Crossover date is the time where allocation of principal and losses to the super seniors change to pro rata from sequential]
2. For cash flow modelling, assume loans will not default for 3yrs and apply a 24mth recovery period before losses up to 30% would be applied (at the end of the fifth year). Any additional losses applied the following month, expect losses due to maturity.
3. Use Trepp's cash flow model to apply recoveries through the capital structure of the transaction to determine which certificates had an ending balance of $0, and would therefore retain their 'AAA' ratings.

Credit Market Evolution
This report on Sribd from Deutsche entitled 'The Future Refinancing Crisis in CRE' is another one worth reviewing, to understand the refinancing challenges within CRE right now. 

On a side note, the markets have been changing the structuring of resecuritisation in the last few years, in order to juice up tranches and create more AAA-rated bonds as assets became distressed.  How?  By moving away from the much maligned CDO to re-REMIC's (REsecuritization of Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits).

To see how these can be misused, take a look at this crap published by Fannie Mae back in December 2007 - see page 2 for the re-REMIC's section in which they state:

"Market participants know that almost any type of MBS can be used as collateral for Fannie Mae REMICs."

I think we're starting to see part of the problem Fannie, when you openly state almost any MBS will do. How to mortgage the future of the next generation in America through incompetence in one easy step. Let's take a look back at how the process used to work for the banks in the good old days...

"So, if I offer you this enormous stash of our sub-prime mortgage backed securities, you'll give me REMIC's in exchange?", asks the disbelieving banker.

"Sure, we luuurve you guys - you're one of our biggest clients, and we just keep on buying these.. cos.. hell, I don't know but we do. Anyway, the government wants us to buy 'em." replies the Fannie Mae redneck employee.

"I love this job.. ok fine in that case here's $50bn of our worst shit we couldn't sell to Bernie Madoff, and in exchange we'll have those nice AAA-rated Fannie re-REMIC's and sell them onto clients. As a sweetener, we'll even throw in vouchers for you and your family to have a 3 course meal at Cracker Barrel." 

"HELL YES!" replies the Fannie Mae redneck. "If there's Cracker Barrel in the deal, then you've got yourself one."

However back to reality, and re-REMIC tranches are attained in a different way to the particularly special blend of bullshit that the banks came up with previously to produce AAA-grade paper from sub-prime toxicity. Rating levels now are attained with a heavy emphasis on collateralisation - hence why rating changes like today increase uncertainty and problems.

For example, triple-A paper in recent offerings has had the most extraordinary 50% subordination levels; in English that means these would still be AAA rated if half the underlying properties burned down and none of them were insured (which they are). At least in theory, these CMBS are almost unnecessarily safe, thus should not ever be downgraded.

A trader is quoted in a Commercial Mortgage journal as stating that: "The life insurance companies are driving this. For regulatory capital reasons, they benefit from holding bonds that have more ratings stability."

Credit Future
This activity had lead to tighter spreads in the resecuritization market for super-senior bonds, leading to increases in their prices on the market and a general upturn in activity at last. However the junior tranche CMBS going out onto the market still have a significantly higher 30% subordination rate, which is a lot better than the triple-A class deals of old.

To me that is a sign that the quality of the bonds is improving to instill genuine confidence in the AAA-rating once again, and rightly so. Going back to the rating agencies, these sorts of problems then derail such progress by increasing the spreads.

GGP
Despite this, looking back at GGP, this is all part of wider series of moves by the government towards improving the credit markets and is to be welcomed by shareholders as a further means of assisting the firm in restructuring.

Indications continue to be reported that the government is open to reassessing TALF terms and conditions, but these mostly are around an extension to the scheme time frame, not a meaningful change to the criteria. Talking of GGP, there has been little going on besides some arguing between GGP and Hugo Boss relating to the latter wishing to terminate a signed lease early due to delays. Boss are likely to have that dismissed and are just trying their luck with a filing like this.

Otherwise the rulings today are largely unimportant, or have already been made (e.g. around the Success Fee). Somebody needs to slip a bottle of whisky to the good judge and tell him to hurry up and make his decision on the SPE inclusion issue…

Exploiting Loopholes

The golden rule with tennis, as with finance, is to always put your money on the Swiss. Tough luck on poor old Andy Roddick though, the guy was rightly gutted and is too good to only win a single major in his career so let's hope he comes back and wins another.

So the final legal submissions have now been made - this includes General Growth's post-hearing submissions against MetLife and against ING Clarion and Wells Fargo. The Committee of Unsecured Creditors, and the unsecured lenders ING Clarion, Helios AMC, and of course MetLife. They are really just summarising the arguments already put forwards, although additionally MetLife submitted a motion to dismiss evidence submitted by GGP because the "Movants [MetLife] were not provided with a copy to review."

The evidence itself is a summary of the MetLife Debtor groups that own the two malls in question in this appeal. Ultimately they were included to provide evidence of the consolidation benefit to GGP that would come about from their inclusion in Chapter 11. Again, whether this is accepted or rejected is arbitrary and will have little bearing on the overall decision.

Additionally I recommend reviewing two interesting analysis papers discussing the impact of the GGP bankruptcy on the CMBS industry. The first is entitled The GGP Bankruptcy So Far: Grounds for Concern, Sources for Hope, (thanks to GGP Freak for bringing that to my attention - you mentioned it is from a post on one of the boards so perhaps you could post the link). Either way, the article provides an interesting additional summary from legal experts.

It agrees that the notion of 'bad faith' is unlikely to stand up to analysis and sway the impending decision, although here the authors focus on the eleventh hour dismissal of independent directors as the other key factor instead of GGP's ability to prove its decentralised structure and hence requirement to include SPE's in Chapter 11 not directly in default. As I have said previously, many of the arguments being made in this case are being made for the cameras, and this view is clearly shared:

"in the GGP bankruptcy, it seems that the independent director issue may not be fully pursued because of the practicalities of the situation. In the view of some, even if the motions to dismiss are not granted, it is important that these arguments are made, if only to force a decision that will at least provide a benchmark against which lenders can attempt to structure and price transactions going forward."

Also interesting is this observation on the impact of the agreed DIP financing loan from Farallon Capital Management, part of which will be used to pay off the Goldman Sachs loan: "Using the $400 million DIP loan to retire the Goldman Sachs facility effectively increases the leverage on these assets by almost 100 percent."

The second article 'CMBS Bankruptcy Remote Structuring and the Recession: Revisiting the Benefits', was published last week by the Bureau of National Affairs. It provides a much more detailed analysis of CMBS structuring, and crucially an analysis on how the GGP rulings to date are impacting the industry. One telling remark is that the SPE bankruptcy remote structure has been "largely untested" to date, and only once these are resolved will the credit markets be able to move forwards with confidence and accurately rate and price risk into credit investments.

Where this article is useful is in summarising key ways in which SPE's "theoretically mitigates" risks:

1. Independent Directors to vote/approve the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings - the controversial one that we know about from its alleged 'misuse' during GGP's filing, which illustrated contractual holes.
2. Limits Debt that an entity can incur - both secured and unsecured, the court rulings have upheld this concept and ensured that GGP will not be able to load them up with additional debt as a result of their inclusion in Chapter 11.
3. Ensure that SPE assets/liabilities are not consolidated with those of a parent or affiliate that is involved in a bankruptcy - in reality this has not taken place in GGP's case from their inclusion in Chapter 11 either, although there would be a significant benefit from consolidation of net cash flows and of course negotiations.

As if anybody needed confirmation that the markets were being presumptuous about CMBS's, the article comments: "CMBS sponsors and lenders, supported by many of the credit rating agencies, relied heavily on the assumption that the remote bankruptcy provisions, specifically the independent director provisions, in the SPE’s governing documents would provide protection against an SPE borrower filing for voluntary bankruptcy."

Where the article becomes much more interesting is an examination of the circumstances in which GGP has been able to utilise cash flows as a collateral. Normally it would not be allowed, unless the lender consents, or the debtor convinces the court that "the lender’s interest in the cash collateral is ‘adequately protected.' "

This notion of 'adequate protection' means proving to the court that "the collateral is not being dissipated to the ultimate detriment of the lender. Typically this condition is satisfied if the property continues to generate cash flow and the lender is given a lien on post-petition income to replace the cash collateral that is expended." Despite the turbulence in commercial real estate valuations, it is fair to assume that the value of the assets exceeds debt in all cases before the court at present.

As such this is precisely what the Courts have awarded all of GGP's lenders who have appealed for their respective malls to be removed from Chapter 11. Despite a lien on cash collateral not being as appealing to lenders than instant access to the cash flows from the malls, income is safeguarded by the decisions made by Judge Gropper, by ensuring they are serviced and repaid in the event of liquidation.

The article concludes a summary of ways in which the GGP rulings to date are impacting the industry and a realistic assessment of the next steps relating to restructuring. Ultimately the ability of GGP to control the independent directors of its SPE's is seen as a key weakness in the current structure of SPE's. The legal authors point out that despite this it is very much legal, :

"Despite the fact that the removal and replacement of the independent directors may have violated the spirit of the original agreement with the lenders, GGP’s actions were permitted under state law and do not appear to have been prohibited by the organizational documents of the SPE borrowers."

In fact, the article even advises lenders able to who have the opportunity to "revisit the governance terms of borrower SPEs, would be well advised to consider modifying the 'remove and replace' provisions relating to the independent directors."

In many ways this suggests that GGP's bankruptcy is unique in another sense, due to timing and its ability to exploit weaknesses in the contracts that will be closed in the future. That being the case, any investors contemplating on taking positions in other REIT's in a similar position to GGP should exercise caution. It would be unwise to simplistically assume that other companies will necessarily be able to exploit this loophole for long, and so need to investigate the underlying SPE structures and contracts.

And finally:

"As the GGP bankruptcy progresses, given the uncertainties in the valuation of commercial real estate in the current markets, it will be interesting to see whether GGP attempts to reduce required interest payments based on the current market value of its properties and, if it does, how the bankruptcy court will determine the valuations of these properties and how reduced values will affect the commingled use of cash collateral."

Bear in mind how early into the bankruptcy process this all is - decisions made now can be amended throughout GGP's period in Chapter 11 on appeal. Meantime all of the information is before the court, suggesting a ruling is impending.

Addendum: just tidied up this post - you could tell I wrote and posted it during the Wimbledon Final, what a bloody mess it was...

Greed Guarantees It Will Happen Again

It is interesting how everything in life is cyclical. You're born a disgusting, wrinkly ball akin to the stomach parasite from Alien, unable to speak or wipe your own bottom - and if lucky you end up that way again by your late-80's.

On the subject of cycles, do we truly learn from mistakes? Perhaps on a generational level, but surely not beyond that, which is why so many of the problems we are seeing now have happened before. It is the same point raised in the book 'The Millionaire Next Door', which observes how the wealth acquired by self-made millionaires through frugality is usually lost within a couple of generations, as their offspring piss it all away pursuing a materialistic utopia.

Anyway my point was actually around the whole Bernard Madoff fraud, and the absolute certainty that it will happen again in the future. I don't care what politicians and others in the press state about controls to prevent it, that is simply not the case. Wherever there are naive and/or lazy investors, there will be largely unregulated, opaque funds promising fabulous returns that seem too good to be true

In one sense everything is legal until you are caught - something that Enron illustrated impressively - although not a position I agree with, despite notions of 'right' and 'wrong' being grounded solely in perspective.

So it was with some interest that I got some perspective when I chanced upon a CMBS securitization dealer from another bank over at a Corney & Barrow champagne reception last Friday. It was completely random, at a wedding drinks bash: not mine, and sadly and not corporate - the days of charging everything back are sadly not yet there again.

I was most surprised to find out the trader worked for RBS, who having notched up losses to rival Citibank, and really are a basket case in the world of banking these days. My first question to him of course, apart from the standard piss-take "what's it like to work in the public sector these days?", was what he was still doing there with a job?

He confirmed my suspicions by admitting to being the only one left of a team of 25 a year ago. An interesting illustration of another factor reducing the CMBS transactions taking place, given the headcount reductions to support the transactions. In effect though, he is minding the shop with respect to their existing CMBS portfolio - but did add he is still an originator.

Obviously I had to bring up the subject of General Growth, more to see if he knew anything about it and the potential impact of the SPE ruling. He knew enough for me to have some fun ripping his industry apart, as I reminded him what a joke the previous contracts and sales processes had been.

He did not disagree, but gave the inside perspective - namely that it was really for the clients to complete the due diligence as they were the ones impacted. That is fair enough, but as I reminded him that is not really a valid view given the $50bn loss RBS took last year - it might just be arguable that they were impacted as well. He also confirmed the rumours I have heard that the industry is busy co-ordinating a complete re-structuring of SPE's and associated contracts that will supersede what is currently on the market.

Hardly a surprise, but what that does suggest is that when we finally receive a ruling it will not have nearly the ramifications that some would suggest. There is otherwise little news on the GGP front besides some minor legal applications ahead of future hearings.

Good news for me is that the functional spec will (at last!) be finished by the weekend. It has taken me about 2.5mths due to work, and after drafting up a high level technical spec next, I could in theory get it built in the next couple of weeks. However I will be moving onto the biggest job of all next - populating the site content. Rather more important at this stage, and given the site will provide industry grade investment research papers to registered users (for free), that is going to take time to get ready. I will be covering everything from corporate finance to investment products, market psychology and all trading products on the market, whether investors have access to them or not.

The key to successful investing, particularly for those aspiring to reach high net worth status, is building strong foundations - and that goes beyond simply building knowledge. Either way this site is going to be a more intelligent alternative to the main investment tabloids.

TALF Legacy Unveiled: Does It Impact GGP?

The eventual expansion of TALF criteria to include broader assets and older CMBS was discussed in government committees back in Jan/Feb, so this has been looking likely for some time. The TALF Legacy was finally announced last night, and the Terms and FAQ are worth taking the time to review.

On immediate reading, it would be easy to get carried away with the news, and assume this is overwhelmingly positive for GGP - it could potentially solve all of its refinancing problems!

Hold on, hold on dear. Certainly it is not negative, since it will benefit the wider credit markets: any thawing of those it to be welcomed, since it provides additional capital for refinancing other loans - the aim of the whole programme after all. In itself GGP's status in Chapter 11 is not the issue here; eligibility for TALF Legacy funding is made at an individual CMBS level, and that is what will impact GGP's ability to utilise this for refinancing of loans.

So how does GGP's CMBS portfolio stack up?

The criteria stipulated by the Fed is that: "Eligible collateral will not include a CMBS that obtains such credit ratings based on the benefit of a third-party guarantee or a CMBS that a TALF CMBS-eligible rating agency has placed on review or watch for downgrade."

Fitch has made several precautionary downgrades of GGP CMBS's since 20 April to reflect the increased potential risk. This Seeking Alpha article summarises without going into specifics, including the Fitch announcement that it downgraded the outlook from Stable to Negative on "63 properties [which] secure 58 loans in Fitch-rated U.S. CMBS transactions."

According to Fitch "the revised Rating Outlooks are in large part due to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing of General Growth Properties (GGP) and certain affiliates which are borrowers in CMBS transactions."

That means many are ruled out of eligibility for TALF Legacy at present, and due to the uncertainty at the time, includes all those commercial mortgage backed securities that transferred to special servicing after their inclusion in Chapter 11 - the list is too numerous, but means those collateralised by malls including:

• Boise Town Plaza and Square (Idaho)
• Newgate Mall (Utah)
• Northridge Fashion Center (California)
• Willowbrook Mall (New Jersey)

What is worth noting is that it was the uncertainty around the bankruptcy which was a key factor in the downgrades. The rating agencies may start to respond to the recent ruling for SPE's to remain within Chapter 11 with a reassessment. The primary risk factor cited was that GGP "could seek additional leverage secured by the mortgaged properties to help repay their corporate unsecured debt. The presence of additional debt would put substantial additional stress on the properties and impair the performance of the CMBS transactions."

Judge Gropper's ruling protects the integrity of CMBS pulled into Chapter 11, since the underlying collateral cannot be laden with further debt, so arguably this will require an offset upgrade in future - although rating agencies are frequently cautious, and that by no means implies they would be upgraded to the necessary AAA status required.

Fitch has stated that it "will continue to monitor the performance of the GGP assets in addition to the progress of the bankruptcy proceedings. As the developing situation becomesclearer and as property performance warrants, Fitch will take additional ratings actions as appropriate."

Meanwhile this post here includes an article with some detail around the credit industry reaction to the GGP ruling, and their presence at the ICSC conference.

Time will tell how beneficial this proves for GGP. If I were an agency, I think I would rate this development a Cautious-Positive.

Round 1 To GGP As CMBS Industry Overplays Its Hand

I will move off so many updates on GGP soon, not least as I am busy looking into other investment opportunities. However there was enough news late yesterday to warrant an update.

Firstly on DIP financing, after swinging between bidders (and worth noting that bidding for DIP financing is in itself a rarity), GGP turned down both Pershing Square and a consortium lead by Goldman Sachs, and instead opted for the group lead by hedge fund Farallon Capital Management.

Details seem largely unchanged from before at $400m of funding with a 12% interest rate and no warrants, apart from a lower exit fee and now a potential 8% equity repayment option - that is subject to GGP's equity value upon emerging from bankruptcy.

At present the exact details of the DIP financing are not available, although The Washington Post quotes Ackman as saying: "This is the best DIP loan that has been done since the beginning of the recession, and it could be the best DIP loan ever in terms of the structural features that are favorable to the company."

All indications had been that the Court hearing yesterday was going to rule in GGP's favour. So it proved, with both DIP Financing approved, and Judge Gropper, presiding over GGP's case, ruling for the SPE's inclusion in the Chapter 11 filing.

This brings the inital phase of proceedings to a conclusion, after much legal wrangling (and whinging) on both sides. Various lobby groups representing the CMBS industry, fearing the ramifications from investors if their products did not deliver on the promised bankruptcy protection, launched into the most hilarious claims.

The end result was that they stretched credibility and overplayed their hand.

"The GGP bankruptcy filing could - if passed - be disastrous for the CMBS [industry] in the US" warned Conor Downey, a partner at Paul Hastings. He then went on to claim that such a ruling would somehow lead to an enormous downgrade of CMBS debt and that none could attain triple-A rating again.

The highly impartial Mortgage Bankers Association also added their voice, stating grave concerns over the 'catastrophic' impact of such a precedent.

An official from the CMSA (Commercial Mortgage Securities Association) also over-exaggerated the situation by stating: "It is not an exaggeration to say that if a CMBS lender cannot get comfortable with the isolation of the real property asset to be financed and hence the cashflows derived from the operation of such asset, then no such financing will occur."

Yes, except that this does not mean CMBS lenders could not get comfortable with isolating the asset being financed. Fortunately the seasoned Judge Gropper was unimpressed with such overstatement. Even earlier in the week, such claims had been dismissed as "hyperbole".

Judge Gropper overruled the objections yesterday, rightly saying that lenders rights were protected and General Growth should have access to cash collected at its subsidiaries. The notion that commercial mortgage backed securites somehow mean lenders have a legal right to control the cashflow is clearly wrong. It would hinder a viable company, capable of fully servicing its debts to those creditors, from moving out of bankruptcy.

Where GGP had been out of line was an implicit suggestion in the bankruptcy loan that the underlying collateral for the existing CMBS loans (i.e. malls) could be used as collateral for the new DIP loan. That illustrates what CMBS do provide - a guarantee that the asset cannot be misused, and will always be there to enable repayment for the creditors, even in a bankruptcy.

Matt Reid, a senior financial analyst at DBRS made a telling observation, by stating that "the GGP bankruptcy is unique in that most of its CMBS loans are performing reasonably well with strong debt service coverage and likely equity value above the mortgage debt."

Additionally Reid concurs with my previous analysis into the motives for including SPE's: "After reviewing the bankruptcy filing documents, we think the motivation for the filing of the SPEs is to generate better negotiating leverage with the special servicer to extract the value above the CMBS mortgages, while keeping such debt current. The plan is to use this cashflow as working capital during the reorganisation process, which could be several years. Such a ruling would be positive for unsecured creditors."

Round 1 to GGP and unsecured creditors then. It will be interesting how (or if) this impacts the share price later today upon opening.

CMBS Industry Gets A Wake Up Call

I have been following recent events in the commercial mortgage backed security market with interest since General Growth Properties filed for Chapter 11 on April 16.

The headlines have recently been around an alternative DIP financier being announced.  This is good news for GGP, because it has improved terms - in particular relating to potential equity dilution, which is the primary threat to common shareholders. Pershing Square had both a 4.9% warrant and a 5% equity conversion clause linked to the DIP repayment.

By contrast the new DIP terms removes the warrant, although replaces the 5% equity conversion with 6% (and demotes DIP financing to a junior lien on cash collateral - in effect making repayment less prioritised versus other secure debt to appease creditors). The equity conversion is considerably less than previously however, and as I said before ought to have minimal impact on the firm, as this could only be exercised upon successful emergence from bankruptcy. By which time the firm capitalisation should be hugely higher.

Of more interest were the recent details around the degree of investigation and preparation that GGP put into their bankruptcy filing, designed to ensure they maximise leverage when negotiating with creditors further down the line.

Firstly, it should be said that the issue here all comes down to one of expectations. Those lenders who entered into the various credit products being sold by the banks over the last 5 years, such as commercial mortgage backed securites, were reassured during the sales pitch by the way they were structured.

I know because I work with credit sales people at the banks, and their oily schmooze would be enough to convince me that they know what they are talking about, were I not familiar with the legal grey area in the detail beneath the surface.  In the event, salesmen just regurgitate a well-honed sales pitch, whether they're selling CMBS's or used cars.

"Debt is tiered by risk and reward, so if you take out the higher grade debt in this product, you will be first in line for repayment in the event of a default" schmoozes the salesman.

"But what about if they go bankrupt, and take the whole thing down with them?" asks the nervous-but-greedy investor. "Surely then being first in line isn't going to be any use."

"Ah but that is all factored into the inherent design of this product", reassures the schmoozy salesman. "Commercial mortgage backed securities from DodgyBank Inc are structured with the issuer to be held through a 'special purpose vehicle'."

"What the hell is that?" asks the nervous-but-curious greedy investor.

"It's a clever legal structuring of the debt, that provides additional insurance. The holder of the security and underlying collateral is not the company that owns the malls, it's an independent legal entity which is bankruptcy remote. That means if they go under, your asset does not, so you are guaranteed to be first in line if they default as all the cash flows towards repaying you."

"Wow, that's awesome - I can't lose! Put me down for $10 million on one of the really big REIT's.. hmm, that fast growing one 'General Growth Properties' looks good."

Of course, had these idiots bothered to do some due diligence, they would have read the finer print and worked out that the companies had far more control over those special purpose vehicles (aka 'special purpose entities' or SPE's) than they realised.

In GGP's case, they had the power to hire or fire the directors of the SPE's for the underlying assets (malls) as they so chose. As such, they did just that in the weeks leading up to bankruptcy. Unsurprisingly all 166 SPE boards then subsequently backed having their malls enter Chapter 11 with GGP, so this was firstly quite legal.

In papers filed Wednesday in U.S. bankruptcy court in New York, General Growth argued the CMBS investors' objections to including the SPEs "appear grounded in the misperception that 'bankruptcy remote' means 'bankruptcy proof'."

Now the battle ground is set between GGP, which wants to strengthen its position, and outraged creditors that wish to prevent the malls which their loans are secured against being included in bankruptcy (and the cashflows going to elsewhere in the business).

Unfortunately for the creditors, as the Wall Street Journal reports yesterday, GGP have prepared a significant argument to the court by pledging "to continue paying interest on its mortgages, possibly making it more difficult for CMBS holders to argue they should be allowed to foreclose. It also pledged to provide its mortgage lenders 'adequate protection,' meaning they will have an administrative claim in any liquidation scenario to cash flow drawn from their properties by the parent company."

Whatever the court decides will have far-reaching implications for the wider credit markets, but the odds are strongly in favour of GGP persuading the courts to go ahead with this, as it is very difficult to argue this is not in the wider interest of the market and commercial real estate industry to allow this to happen.

Otherwise the only news today is that I snapped after nearly 5 hours of wedding related shopping on the Kings Road earlier.  After a row with L about how all she seems to want to do with time off is go shopping, and how I have better things to do (such as finish the functional spec), she has gone off for a hair appointment, and I'm contemplating whether this is what married life is going to be like.

Perhaps I ought to Google 'marriage pre-nup'...

A Change Of Perspective

"Woe betide thee, who has a desk move imposed upon them and loses a spectacular City window view and privacy, to face an office cupboard with a sign reading 'Restricted Access Area' while surrounded by irritating colleagues on all sides"  The Emerging Investor

Having been pulled onto this tedious Hedge Fund confidence-boosting initiative at the bank, I was duly forced to move desks to sit with the new team this week. Quite why is beyond me, as I was only sitting about 20 yards away from them before, and in this digital age we mostly communicate through email, communicator and conference calls anyway.

The bank being as tight as it is, rather than paying for the desk/equipment movers to come in, they left it to me to spend 1.5hrs crawling around on my hands and knees to unplug and switch PC's - all while avoiding the mouse traps down under the desks (we have a problem with rodents - both human and otherwise).

I'm mostly not pleased because I was happily working on my site on the quiet at work as I haven't been too busy recently, and the wireframes for the Functional Spec are rather too visible to pass as financial work.  Now I might even have to do some work for my money at this rate.

Anyway it's not all bad news, as the actual site design has been progressing very well, and I am confident that within the next week or so I will have it sufficiently completed to approach vendors.  They are in for a grilling given that part of my daily job is managing incompetence, and I expect nothing less from them with the build.

There is nothing of interest happening yet regarding GGP, besides Vornado being confirmed as a major potential front runner in buying any GGP assets put up for sale, and having raised sufficient capital to make reasonable offers.  Also following on from my last post regarding GGP including CMBS subsidiaries in its Chapter 11 filing, which has major ramifications for the credit markets; unsurprisingly a challenge is being mounted by one of the groups who would be adversely impacted.

The creditor meeting in a fortnight from now should prove interesting, but this is going to be a slow, lengthy process in which patience is the biggest strength any investor can show.

Next time I am going to move back to investing, which will be especially useful for those interested in shorting. It is a question I have been asked by several people recently, and is actually much easier than you would think. Anybody with a standard broker account can do it today, and I will outline how and some of the options.

Analysis: GGP Declares Chapter 11

Well, the loss of my lunchtime bolt hole has proved a bit of a problem for me in finding time to post in the last couple of weeks. To be fair, I have been working on (and completed) a draft of the business plan, and have also selected a group of vendors to approach in the coming weeks for a build estimate.

Meantime my next major task is completing a functional spec for the site, as there's no way I trust the average coding monkey with the all-important design and usability. Overall it is going very well, and I am feeling really positive that I can create something unique, useful and commercially viable.

Of course the big news of the last fortnight was GGP finally filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.

The final straw was the combination of the bond solicitation process failing to persuade sufficient Rouse bondholders to extend, and the threat of action from disgruntled creditors ready to file a claim on certain malls - that meant GGP had little choice but to seek to protect its assets from being effectively raided.

GGP filed with $27.3 bln debt and $29.6 bln assets - figures that are of course disputed - and obtained $375 million in debtor-in-possession financing courtesy of Pershing Square.

Bill Ackman is a canny operator, and clearly used this to hedge Pershing's existing position (at 25% they are the third largest shareholder in GGP currently). By providing DIP financing, Pershing yields a healthy 12% annual return on the debt. Additionally Pershing gain warrants to buy 4.9% of the new equity when it emerges from bankruptcy, and most interestingly the potential to convert the $375m DIP into equity.

The latter option has to be admired, as it ensures Pershing Square will be guaranteed equity whichever way the firm emerges from bankruptcy. I am confident however that it remains strongly in Ackman's interests to maintain common shareholder value, although this does now raise the spectre of dilution. I have analysed this in some detail, and believe that dilution risk is a minimal factor: if the event occurs, that means GGP will have successfully restructured, emerged from bankruptcy and the huge upside potential to the shares will offset and limit any impact.

GGP President, Tom Nolan, gave several interviews subsequently, and placed the blame squarely on the frozen credit markets as the primary cause of GGP's current problems. It will clearly form the central crux when outlining the company's argument as to why a loan extension agreement is justified, and increases the likelihood of approval by the courts.

Certainly the fact that no major rivals who wanted to buy some of the best, revenue-generating properties put up for sale could secure funding is a powerful illustration of the wider market problems, and in favour of GGP.

Nolan also stated that GGP does not see an immediate need to tap DIP financing for 8 weeks, due to cash flow business running costs illustrates the relatively healthy position of the business model. Once again, GGP stands out as an unusual case. Bill Ackman also immediately went to the press to rubbish assumptions by many that GGP's weakness would be to the gain of rivals, by effectively meaning Chapter 11 meant liquidation and an eventual firesale of assets.

Today Fitch downgraded some of GGP's CMBS debt, citing that:

"If the properties remain in bankruptcy, General Growth could seek to load up the properties with additional debt to help repay their corporate unsecured debt."

So far, everything has progressed exactly as I had hoped with regards to the Chapter 11 filing, with the exception of Pershing's DIP equity conversion option. Liquidation and/or widescale share dilution remain the only scenarios in which being long in GGP would not produce significant returns.

It will be interesting finding out what the restructuring proposal submitted to the court contains.  The above illustrates another mechanism by which GGP could pay off unsecured lenders and/or the bondholders without necessarily needing to sell properties.  A key point mentioned here but not considered is that GGP are completing a strategic review, with a specific aim of only offering to liquidate lesser malls as part of the court proposal.

A combination of financial re-engineering, some limited asset sales, and a wider extension request for loans until the credit markets recover sufficiently to enable normal refinancing is the most likely right now.