Keep Your Eye On The Horizon

A crucial part of investing is to look in all directions towards the horizon. By that I means forwards as well as backwards, since it is both anticipation and retrospective understanding that enable us to increase our ability to make the best decisions.

The best traders and investors are those who adapt fastest from mistakes - and learn from them. It is not about selling when an unrealised loss reaches a huge number for example, but determining whether that situation will recover, or if it is indeed time to cut your losses and analyse what went wrong.

"Indeed one's faith in one's plans and methods is truly tested when the horizon before one is the blackest." Mahatma Gandhi

Hence why my focus on General Growth Properties intensified as its stock price fell throughout Q1 2009. As we know, everything so far has gone well for GGP as an investment recently, but it is well worth spending time re-assessing the stock now.

How exactly does it stack up relative to its peers on current valuations? What are the likely prospects regarding securing advantageous terms with lenders ahead of submitting a reorganisation proposal to the Court? What are the primary risk factors remaining (e.g. dilution), and what is the likely price range in 12 months? Take a look at this table of the American REIT Peer Group, which details the share price performance of GGP relative to its peers over the last 3-12 months.

The statistics speak for themselves as to which has been the best hold over the last 6 months, with GGP up a massive 403.20%. Having said that, this is in no small part due to its enormous discount due to bankruptcy risk - hence the 87.90% year-on-year fall.

For a selected group I have added in some analyst FFO estimates for 2009/10; firstly note the zero 6 month dividend yield - a shame for those of us with plenty of shares. One of the most striking observations is when we look at the forward NAV (Net Asset Value), this reflects GGP's market value based on its real estate properties, and the figure is derived from the total number of shares. At just 3.5, this is a massive 14.8x lower than Simon Property Group, and 8.4x lower than Regency. Why is GGP so much lower? The primary reason remains the uncertainty forward priced due to its status in Chapter 11, and its ability to secure asset prices or cap rates.

However looking at the sector as a whole, commercial real estate has gone through a rally that has pushed up valuation levels to near previous peak levels. If we take a benchmark (EV/EBITDA is more accurate the P/E ratios for REIT's) then the sector average is at a multiple of 14 right now. That gives an implied cap rate in the 6-7% range. However that also means that as on average, REIT's are now averaging 12.8X the 2010 Funds From Operation (per share) estimates - strikingly that is a 23% premium to long-term average multiples.

That actually suggests that for short term traders, now is not necessarily a good time to be entering commercial real estate. However if we go back to GGP, the enormous discount to the sector becomes apparent. At just a 1.5x 2010 FFO/share estimate, it sits markedly as by far the cheapest in the sector, and suggests that should restructuring complete without excessive share dilution - something I will come back to another time - then this clearly remains THE choice in the sector for value investors.

This recent commentary has suggested that the recent ruling on GGP should be considered a one off "largely because [the whole company] has filed for bankruptcy." I think one off is the wrong phrase, what they actually mean is that given most defaults are not at the parent entity level, therefore single entity defaults will not provide any opportunity for debtors to push for the kind of ruling that has just taken place with GGP.

However many other companies operate with a centralised cashflow model, and so could conceivably see similar group wide liquidity problems, so to claim this is a one off is not correct. In fact, this view is shared by the legal firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, which notes:

"..the GGP ruling may herald a trend towards bankruptcy filings by highly structured commercial real estate enterprises which today find themselves vastly over-levered."

The article is well worth reviewing, as it provides some observations around how the complexity of debt tiers acts in itself as an incentive to file for Chapter 11 due to problems restructuring:

"Further fueling potential bankruptcies, many of the highly structured, multi-tranche capital stacks that were set up in the last few years present significant barriers to consensual restructuring outside of bankruptcy. For one, master servicers and special servicers are often constrained in their ability to modify loans because of restrictions under the relevant pooling and servicing agreements and adverse tax consequences under applicable REMIC tax rules."

So with GGP remaining excellent value, I think the right balance of caution about GGP's future is struck with this final passage:

"While this round went to GGP and against the SPE and CMBS lenders, it remains to be seen where the balance struck by the GGP court between creditors’ rights and the interests of equityholders leads when thorny issues such as cramming down secured lenders to extend maturities and alter pricing and other terms to the benefit of equity are presented to the court, or how negotiation and settlement discussions – both in formal bankruptcy proceedings and in consensual non-bankruptcy restructurings – will play out in the post-GGP era."

Another legal commentary by Davis Polk of the recent court ruling is also available here which gives a good summary.

Gropper Decides 'Enough Diversions'

Delicious. It was like waking up to find a fine pie and chips, with a large pint of ale in a country pub waiting for me. That's really the only way I can describe my morning, as L dried her hair and woke me up, but knowing I was 'working' from home today AND then finding out that Judge Gropper has finally made his decision on whether the disputed SPE's should be included.

As I am sure anybody long on GGP is already well aware, the Court has published its memorandum of opinion on this issue, and has ruled in favour of General Growth Properties.

Despite the multitude of other arguments put forwards by the Creditors, Judge Gropper rightly centred on the issue of 'bad faith' as "the primary ground on which dismissal is sought is that the Subject Debtors’ cases were filed in bad faith. It is also contended that one of the Subject Debtors was ineligible to file." Page 4, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

While other arguments were raised relating to some malls not having other significant creditors, and the alleged need to include entities due to the centralised nature of the GGP business model (despite other entities such as the Joint Ventures not being included), these really were in there to flesh out the argument. The central premise of this filing has always been around the issue of proving 'bad faith'.

I mentioned in previous analysis that this was highly unlikely to be upheld based on Wells Fargo's own definition of this as:

"...a balancing process between the interests of debtors and creditors which characterizes so many provisions of the bankruptcy laws and is necessary to legitimize the delay and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy."

Gropper's submission gives a useful summary of the GGP group structure including its loan structures - this includes detail on how the underlying CMBS are sold onto the wider market as re-REMIC's: something those who have been reading my recent posts will be familiar with. This demonstrates that the Movant arguments for dismissal of SPE's with a single creditor are actually nonsense:

"The REMIC in turn sells certificates entitling the holders to payments from principal and interest on this large pool of mortgages." Page 10, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In effect, negotiations relating to such SPE's can be extraordinarily complex under situations requiring an exceptional extension or refinancing agreement, and can realistically only be achieved with consortium consent, a cramdown or through Chapter 11.

As part of the court justification for the decision, the memo of opinion goes into some detail outlining the plight of General Growth Properties, explaining how its previously industry-standard CMBS refinancing model was left at the mercy of the credit crisis. The submissions goes into detail explaining the refinancing and debt restructuring efforts made:

"...but the lenders were unwilling to consent to additional forbearance, which in turn led to defaults and cross-defaults. Furthermore, the GGP Group was generally unable to sell any of its assets to generate the cash necessary to pay down its debts, as potential purchasers were themselves unable to acquire financing." Page 15, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This includes confirming GGP's inability to renegotiate loans set to mature by January 2010 due to the refusal by the master servicers to allow them to communicate with the underlying creditors. This has all been covered previously in GGP's own submissions, but clearly won over the Court as a convincing reason behind its need to move into Chapter 11.

The memo breaks down its ruling by addressing each of the key objection reasons put forward by the creditors.

Bad Faith Dismissal
The first point made is that 'bad faith' filings are "a judge-made doctrine" and not an absolute that can be proven by lawyers citing previous cases in their arguments. Gropper notes that dismissal of the SPE's from Chapter 11 on these grounds should only be granted "if both objective futility of the reorganization process and subjective bad faith in filing the petition are found.” Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Additionally Judge Gropper concludes that no one factor on this issue can be determinative - the Court cites a previous ruling and states:

"It is the totality of circumstances, rather than any single factor, that will determine whether good faith exists... Case law recognizes that a bankruptcy petition should be dismissed for lack of good faith only sparingly and with great caution." Page 19, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, this goes back to previous legal analysis of Court submissions that ultimately GGP and the Court needed to consider what is in the best interests of everybody here, not just the few secured creditors that would benefit from liquidation. The Court dismisses comparisons cited with bad faith rulings made on single-assets real estate debtors, and slaps down MetLife in particular by pointing to the fact that both ING Clarion and Helios even concede that GGP do intend to reorganise and emerge from bankruptcy protection.

Objective Bad Faith: Prematurity
The court answers the allegation that GGP filed for bankruptcy 'prematurely' on entities with a maturity date beyond March 2010, as the prospect of liability was too remote. The Court answer is that this is irrelevant, the question is "whether the Subject Debtors were in actual financial distress on the Petition Date", and of course that is undeniable.

Ultimately this issue cannot be upheld because "the goal of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to incentivize a debtor to file earlier rather than later, so as to preserve the value of the estate." Page 26, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

This ruling is summarised that it "...is not to assert that every stand-alone company with ample cash flow would necessarily act in good faith by filing a Chapter 11 petition three years before its only debt came due. However, contrary to Movants’ contentions, the Court is not required in these cases to examine the issue of good faith as if each Debtor were wholly independent." Page 27, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper finishes off by pointing to a weakness in the creditor's arguments on this: namely not explaining "how the billions of dollars of unsecured debt at the parent levels could be restructured responsibly if the cash flow of the parent companies continued to be based on the earnings of subsidiaries that had debt coming due in a period of years without any known means of providing for repayment or refinance." Page 30, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

In other words, General Growth Property had no choice to take the decision it did in filing for Chapter 11 protection, because it had no realistic prospect of refinancing at a group level and that was the only criteria it could make when choosing to bring the wider structure with it in the filing.

Inability To Confirm A Plan
Another of MetLife's more absurd arguments was the suggestion of bad faith because a plan could not be confirmed in advance of filing for Chapter 11, and that they would never be able to confirm a plan over its own opposition! The logic to this was clearly flawed, and Judge Gropper devotes an appropriately short space to citing previous case law that proves this is utter rubbish with no basis in the Bankruptcy Code.

Subjective Faith
The arguments here were around not negotiating prior to filing and the firing of several independent managers / directors of SPE's ahead of the Chapter 11 filing. The Court confirmed that actually Bankruptcy law does not require negotiations to begin prior to any filing - this is certainly not sufficient for proof of bad faith. Gropper adds his views on this:

"On this record, there is no evidence that pre-filing talks would have beenadequate to deal with the extent of the problem. Indeed, there is no evidence Movants would have been willing to work with the Subject Debtors." Page 36, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Again Judge Gropper reserves additional criticism for MetLife, who despite having some mortgage loans as well as the unwieldy CMBS structures that caused so many problems with negotiations of loans further out, revealed some fascinating views via their internal documents called for examination by the Courts:

"...there is no indication that it [MetLife] would have readily agreed to a refinancing of any of its loans." Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

"In December 2008, the head of real estate investments at Metlife identified its debt exposure to GGP (as a group) as a 'lessons learned opportunity.' A director and member of the research group responded, 'We wouldn’t do a loan with GGP now, given their problems.'" Page 37, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

That's what you call 'the Smoking Gun' regarding MetLife's intentions and hence need for General Growth to file for Chapter 11.

Relating to GGP's activities with its somewhat dubious late dismissal of Independent Directors of many SPE's ahead of voting in favour of joining Chapter 11, Judge Gropper surprised me by not just agreeing that this was contractually allowed and hence legal, but also largely agreeing that in many cases this was right and proper.

This was justified by GGP President Thomas Nolan, who explained that the issues requiring their dismissal arose from certain directors who were less experienced with restructuring environments and the challenges the project entities were facing, and who incorrectly agreed with lenders and "thought the independent managers were obligated to protect their interests alone." Page 39, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Gropper goes on the record as stating that the firing of two 'Independent Managers' was "admittedly surreptitious", but falls back on the holes in the CMBS legal contracts, which gave GGP full control over such actions. You could say GGP got away with that one, although indications are that this would never have been a dealbreaker on the wider decision of bad faith, given the need for the Court to consider the wider interests - which is clearly a Chapter 11 restructuring.

Poor Old MetLife
I had long thought that MetLife in particular was whinging more than most of the creditors, with its plethora of largely unjustified complaints submitted to the courts. Perhaps over that bottle of fine 10-year single malt Scotch that should have arrived at the Court last week, the same occurred to Judge Gropper as well.

The Court acknowledged that as a consequence of Chapter 11, "creditors are now only receiving interest on loans, and have been deprived of current amortization payments, and Metlife complains that it is not even receiving interest on its mezzanine loan, which is secured only by a stock interest in its borrower’s subsidiary." Page 41, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

However the court concludes that no additional adequate protection has even been sought by the creditors, who have full rights to recover both the principal (original loan amount) plus interest and post-petition interest once a restructuring plan is confirmed.

"Movants complain that Chapter 11 gives the Debtors [GGP] excessive leverage, but Metlife asserts it has all the leverage it needs to makesure that its rights will be respected." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Let me translate from legalese: shut up and stop whinging.

Summary
Judge Gropper sums this up with true 'third glass of the good stuff at 1am and tired of writing 40 pages to justify himself' style:

"These Motions are a diversion from the parties’ real task, which is to get each of the Subject Debtors out of bankruptcy as soon as feasible. The Movants assert talks with them should have begun earlier. It is time that negotiations commence in earnest." Page 42, MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Impact On Other Rulings
This bodes badly for Citi's ill-timed filing yesterday of a motion to grant relief from the automatic stay under Chapter 11 of its Oakwood Shopping Center. On paper Citi have a strong argument with precedent in their favour: GGP was undersecured by $10million upon entering Chapter 11 in April 2009, and crucially now after an asset revaluation (the accuracy of which is questionable in this market), there is arguably no longer any equity remaining within the property.

"Using KTR Realty's appraised value, the Lenders [GGP] are now undersecured by more than $19 million, or approximately 20.3% of the principal amount of the Loan."

Of course, millions of homeowners around the world are in negative equity right now, and without the support of an enormous REIT. However because they continue to service their loans they are not having a forced repossession.

When put like that, Citi's claim seems equally difficult to justify, as precedent rulings previously have not been in cases where loans have continued to be serviced at pre-filing levels, hence no actual material loss suffered by the creditor.

Given the arguments already put forwards above by Judge Gropper in dismissing other such cases, this one looks likely to be swiftly dismissed as well. With General Growth Properties share price now at a new 52 week high as I finish this, I look forwards to unrealised profits climbing ever higher.

Risk Mananging Asset Backed Securitization

GGP Q2 Results
General Growth Properties Q2 results were better than the markets expected. When you strip out exceptionals, many of which are related to Chapter 11 costs, the fundamentals are encouraging, and have rightly been reflected in a significant rise in the share price.

Taking a look at the breakdown, the immediate comparisons appear poor: Funds From Operation (FFO) are down by 73.8% year on year, Core FFO is also down 43.9%. However of much great importance is GGP's Net Operating Income (NOI) - down a much more modest 11% in total, and a very good figure both in comparison to GGP's major peers and market expectations. In fact, excluding the main drag from the MPC's (Master Planned Communities) - with those stripped out we reach the headline figure reported for the main Retail businesses, with NOI down a mere 2.1% on the previous year.

Relatively strong fundamentals adds further credibility to the GGP business model. The increasing market capitalization of the firm is a direct reflection of growing confidence across the market in its ability to successfully restructure without excessive equity dilution.

Bubbles & Risk Management
I fully admit to not seeing the credit crunch coming until it was too late, and if most people are honest they did not either. In fact, nor did most of the noted commentators - it was a rare few who warned of the dire effects of a credit withdrawal with the years in advance required to avoid these problems.

I thought the dot com and recent housing bubbles were both glaringly obvious, and stayed well out of both. However as I discovered with the credit crunch, bubbles are not always so clear - they have to be hard to spot to enable them to build up.

Risk management was a dirty word on the Street a few years ago. On a few occasions, I remember sneering with the best of them, as calls from risk management about positions being taken were viewed as unnecessarily cautionary. And consistently unnecessary as the high earners and income generators within my former bank confidently dismissed them as overly conservative. I was naively a believer in the pure capitalist argument that too much collateral tied up money that could and should be actively and productively used as part of the development of the 'new economy'. The financial instruments now in use were different; these managed risk as inherent in their design.

Whenever anybody starts justifying practices that generate extraordinary profits and inserts the word 'new' in the context of economics, it is time to beware. Things really weren't different this time of course, just as recessions and crises have occurred with startling regularity throughout the last century. My take on this is that it is the different generation of investors ultimately ensures that reoccurrence. Much like investment, few take the time to research before jumping in, and hence do not learn the lessons of history.

Additionally throw in the less sophisticated consumers in the emerging markets and bubbles in India and China in particular are a virtual certainty – that means the potential to exploit significant, quick profit in the coming years ahead for those willing to take the time to invest in these markets and not play safe at home (much more on this theme another time).

Risk Management of Asset Backed Securities
The one plus of this learning process for our generation is that the regulators have been taking a hard look at the woeful risk management practices in many of the large banks - particularly in the context of asset backed securitization.

The US government is proposing several key legislative changes, which are worth understanding for those inside and outside the industry:

1. Any bank, non-bank issuer or underwriter of an asset-backed security must retain at least a 5% interest of the credit risk in such assets for an as-yet unspecified period or form. Crucially that would be without hedging - the theory being that if firms are themselves exposed to what they are trading, they as shareholders and owners of the banks will take the issue of risk a great deal more seriously.
   
2. Requirement to continue reporting by issuers of asset-backed securities even if the number of holders falls below 300 - this has relevance to the low level issuance/ownership of Structured Purpose Entities (SPE's) that we have seen in General Growth Properties bankruptcy, whereby some creditors have effectively been the sole lender. At present these structures escape under the reporting radar, but soon no longer.


3. Requirement to disclose standardised asset-level or loan-level data and standardised compensation and risk retention information. This really does not have much bearing on risk management, and seems to have been inserted to placate those wishing to have some disclosure of bankers compensation.
   
4. Regulations on the use of representations and warranties in the asset-backed securities market that would require credit rating agencies to include additional analysis in their reports - this would require disclosure permitting investors to identify originators with clear underwriting deficiencies.


5. Elimination of the offering exemption for certain real estate mortgage notes and related participation interests.

If these proposals are adopted, the impact on the securitisation market will depend on the nature and scope of the regulations that are ultimately developed. However it is that first proposal relating to forced exposure which knowing the banks will be the most effective means of ensuring responsible behaviour.

As the cocky young traders I describe in my last entry have long proven, it is easy to play dice with other people's money – and in the right period for the economy a total muppet can make money. However put your own money on the table, and you think about the risk far more seriously. This links back to what bonuses are meant to be about - a performance linked assessment that incentivises traders to trade as effectively as possible – it is that glaring short-termist flaw in them that has been exposed and is rightly attracting criticism.

Bonus reforms remain another vital change that needs to be imposed on the sector, and if I can recognise that then you know there is no excuse for those disagreeing.

Trader Territory Marking

As expected, the motion filed by Hugo Boss for a relief from the automatic stay (see previous entry for link to the motion) was roundly rejected by Judge Gropper last week. Otherwise this story is doing the rounds today, and illustrates how the 'sword' of Chapter 11 can be used as a threat:

"[GGP] said it was considering ways to treat some of its subsidiaries as a single debtor and override their status as separate companies."

This is actually going over old ground, although it would be useful to clarify there is an apparent difference in how substantive consolidation is being used. The major concerns of the credit industry lie in CMBS being substantively consolidated into wider loans such that the agreed collateral is no longer secure - this been addressed in court submissions and will be protected by the replacement lien and order for GGP to provide 'adequate protection'.

There is however a desire and incentive by GGP to consolidate lender negotiations where possible through the Chapter 11 process to assist in restructuring - the two are not necessarily incompatible, although GGP is clearly using this as a threat.

A sign of the changing tide perhaps - our first new trader since 2008 joined the Desk on Monday morning. Somehow we coped after Junior Trader's departure earlier in the year - we lost a character, but not a revenue generator. However increasing volumes and opportunities are encouraging the bank to pick up some people again.

I always enjoy watching new traders when they join a Desk.. the verbal rutting with the old hands an be highly entertaining as they attempt to establish their place in the team. In fact, for those who don't work for banks, just pop on Animal Planet when you get home tonight and you'll get the idea - replace the hogs and territorial scent marking with traders crude humour.

He might have turned into a pious, hypocritical waste of time now, but back in 2007 the columnist Cityboy gave this old example of trade floor dynamics, which plays out in various forms every week:

"Why are you such a fat bastard?" said the posh salesman to the barrow-boy trader, who admittedly did look like he'd been on the notoriously unsuccessful 'all pie diet'.

The recipient of this rather innocuous insult slowly swung around in his seat and with perfect comic timing delivered the oft-used but still classic response: "Because every time I shag your wife she gives me a biscuit".

It is how well a new arrival can handle themselves and fit in with the Desk dynamics that plays a major role in their success at a bank. Obviously though, that only goes so far. Exceptional sales contacts, or an innate talent to manage large portfolios and hence bring in huge amounts of cash make those further up happy and that is what counts most of all.

I've seen some real arses turn up over the years though, and not all have been the 19 year old Essex boy sterotypes - although on that subject, many of them are a particularly special blend of twat. With a stated aim of doing their trading exams straight out of school, these kids are often very average – not even skilled numerically - but to their credit they don't waste their time or money following a route of higher education – and with hindsight I don’t blame them.

I recall an Irish guy who arrived at a former bank I worked for, and made the mistake of continually boasting about senior roles at Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs previously. He also made the mistake of looking down on the rest of us and making sure everybody knew it – I think in a misguided attempt to establish himself as the alpha trader.

Unfortunately that sort of attitude doesn't endear, and within a week the team had dug the dirt on him via ex-colleagues, and confirmed his overstated role and habit for bullshit. On his first day off, the team took some time out in the morning to ceremoniously unveil a sign above his monitor reading 'Little Fella' for him to find upon his return. A reflection of his small stature in more ways than just his height.

Interestingly that was a name which stuck for the remainder of his time there..

Anyway so far our new boy seems fairly quiet - listening and learning about the non-standard systems and what portfolio's he's inheriting. Let's see whether he starts pissing off anybody over the next month or two as he comes out of his shell.

Small Bang Time as GGP Takes Control

I have got far too little time at the moment with the Time Wasting Insolvency initiative nearing its crescendo - hence the lack of entries. Still it's the weekend, it's not like L had plans that might involve taking up more time with wedding preparations surely...

General Growth Properties Extension
A very big plus this week was the news on Tuesday that GGP got the hoped for time extension for the exclusion period to file a restructuring plan, along with a less important extension to the time allowed to file schedules of assets and liabilities.

So what does this actually mean? To Absolutely Confidential's question, yes the commentator you mention did get carried away with regards to General Growth Properties now spending the next six months piling up cash.
General Growth proposed in the original cash collateral motion back in mid-May to continue their prepetition cash management practices. Unless the SPE inclusion decision is overturned - still no formal news on this, but the extension suggests this has been made - then this means GGP has committed to the following as part of the ruling:

• continue the practice of a centralised cash sweep from its various sub-entities into the central firm accounts
• provide 'adequate protection' of creditors cash collateral by providing a replacement lien on intercompany loans - this is the notion of ensuring there is no substantive consolidation of CMBS
• continue to pay interest on CMBS loans at the non-default contract rate
  

It looks like somebody else made the same point in the comments, including referencing back to the Cadwalader court commentary. Sullivan's response: "correct but there is approx. $5B in default that is now another 7 months from being resolved and I believe another $8b that will fall into default during that time frame.."

Just because more loans will fall into default during the next period does not mean they will be treated differently from those pre-bankruptcy. Presumptuous at best, although in most cases firms within Chapter 11 cannot service debts and so do use this period as an effective 'breather' (a significant criticism of Chapter 11, since it can provide weak companies with an unfair competitive advantage during the process).

However GGP have committed to not doing so, partly to illustrate the viability of the existing business model and add credence to extensions being a viable solution.

Regardless this is excellent news for the stock in increasing incentives of creditors to negotiate - and was rightly reflected in a 10% upturn in share price since the announcement. It is striking that every bit of news since General Growth filed for Chapter 11 has been positive.

Industry Changes to Structured Credit Products
Related to changes in the credit markets that I have mentioned previously are the industry protocol updates made by the International Swaps and Derivative Association (ISDA) for restructuring events of credit derivatives. Firstly there was the release of the Big Bang protocol in April 2009, which has been designed to add certainty for investors when defaults occur. Something as we are seeing in recent months has been a significant grey area with existing products when finally tested with a default event.

Big Bang was the final step in a process known in the industry as 'hardwiring', which has crucially incorporated auction settlement terms into standard CDS documentation for the first time. The big bang protocol includes the following:

1. Introduces auction settlement as a means of settling transactions - eliminates the need for defining credit event protocols for every potential scenario to cash settle Credit Default Swaps.
2. Makes resolutions of the Determinations Committees binding by adding into standard CDS contracts - for issues including i) dispute on whether a credit event has occurred, ii) whether obligations are deliverable, iii) whether an auction should be held.
3. Adds credit and succession events (aka backstop 'look back' provisions) into the CDS documentation - to provide a common standard effective date for CDS transactions.
   

Further refinement to resolving restructuring disputes has been added by Small Bang, which took effect on Friday, details of which are covered in this ISDA web presentation. Key additions are to provide buyers with a five day window (sellers with two days) to trigger a credit event after a restructuring has taken place. Once triggered the evidence is then presented to the Determinations Committee to argue the case - a combined arbitrator and judge in the process.

It is all about clarifying how credit derivatives will work in future, and ensuring that buyers and sellers have a clearer idea of what protection (and liability) they are entering into. For those interested in finding out more about what credit companies companies will be entering into over the coming years, and how disputes will be handled, take a look at this analysis.

Additional Reading on re-REMIC's
For recommended additional reading on how structured products are evolving and what are impacting the recovery of the credit market this Bloomberg article illustrates how re-REMIC's are being used by the banks to refinance real estate. This article by Deloitte into re-REMIC's is dry but provides a very detailed examination of how these function and their impact.

Finally this report by Andrew Cuomo into bankers bonuses has to be the least surprising set of observations since the credit crisis of October 2008 plunged the world into recession, although this is the choice quote:

"When the banks did well, their employees were paid well. When the banks did poorly, their employees were paid well. And when the banks did very poorly, they were bailed out by taxpayers and their employees were still paid well."

Welcome to my world Andy...