Is Quantitative Easing The Answer?

I have read a couple of interesting, contrasting views this week in the Telegraph on the subject of quantitative easing between Roger Bootle, the founder of Capital Economics, and Liam Halligan, the economics editor of the Telegraph.

Bootle's article in favour is here, whereas Halligan's exactly opposing viewpoint today is here. For the record, I am in favour of quantative easing, which for me has been highlighted starkly by the plight of General Growth Properties (GGP), and its urgent need for refinancing in order to service its debt load. As I have stated previously, GGP is a healthy company in terms of its asset base versus liabilities, and would be fine servicing its current debts before the credit crunch. Instead it is now left struggling to repay loans as they come due, because of the seizure of the CMBS market and a chronic loss of confidence in its financial viability.

Whilst Liam Halligan gives a useful perspective and balance to those calling for quantitative easing, I was left finishing his column still asking the question 'what precisely are we to do to ease the current credit crisis in that case?' He appears to suggest there is a rabid group of lobbyists suggesting any other viewpoint is held up as a heresy, which unless I am missing something is nonsense. Certainly it has become the consensus opinion amongst government and businesses, but I am quite open to alternatives if a convincing argument can be constructed.

The question is whether it is better to do nothing at all and to let banks and businesses all fail in order to avoid the spectre of inflation and short-term (significant) public debt.

Going back to the commercial real estate sector in the US, and Commercial Backed Mortgage Securities (CBMS) being near completely frozen as a going market. It would be like all banks suddenly refusing you when your fixed term mortgage deal expires, and instead demanding you sell your property at the worst possible moment in the economic cycle. It would lead to huge individual suffering for homeowners, and in the same way will see all manner of otherwise viable companies going to the wall throughout the economy - that means job losses, financial losses, and pain for many.

The US alone has a vast $200bn of such loans coming due in 2009/10 - without QE to fuel the TALF lending that will enable such businesses to refinance and ride out this period, they will simply go under. Why is that better than QE to buy those assets, and eventually sell them back onto the private sector as it thaws (and in effect 'undo' QE, reducing the money supply and trying to avoid inflation being controlled)? I fail to see why targeted action is not better than simply doing nothing.

It is one more week to go until GGP reaches its critical deadline for loan extensions on March 16 - this coincides with the repayment due to Rouse bondholders, who are a group owed money after GGP bought Rouse back in 2004. This ought to see some movement through meaningful announcements - the options being either GGP is forced to file for Chapter 11 due to Rouse bondholders, extensions being announced while TALF funding is still on the near horizon (the whole process is predictably dragging and will take months yet to take effect), asset sales ($400m has been offered for 3 properties on the market for example) to pay off key loans, or a GGP takeover/joint venture.

All are possible, to my mind all will benefit GGP's shareprice significantly. My only wish is that I had bought in now rather than in December, but I expect to see a huge improvement in my position on this trade in the next 6 weeks.